Perry’s Victory on Lake Erie

A.D. 1813

THEODORE ROOSEVELT¹

At the beginning of the war of 1812 most of the leaders of the Amen can war party in Congress were anticipating a contest mainly on the land, where they confidently looked for successes and territorial conquests. They appear to have thought and expected little of the navy, notwithstanding its brilliant services in the Revolution. So little faith had the Administration in the power of the navy that it was determined to lay up the frigates in some safe port, to prevent their capture or destruction. But Captains William Bainbridge and Charles Stewart hastened to Washington and persuaded the President to reverse that decision and let the battleships take part in the war. The navy was destined to play the leading part, and none of its performances did more to increase its prestige than the victory of Perry on Lake Erie. Already there had been notable successes of the navy in the war, such as the capture of the British ship Alert by the Essex, of the Guerriere by the Constitution (the famous "Old lronsides"), of the Frolic by the Wasp, and of the Macedonian by the United States. But the triumph of Perry was of even greater consequence than these.

The war had begun on the New York frontier, and the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River region became a most important part of this theatre. As soon as this fact was recognized, Commodore Isaac Chauncey, who had served in the Tripolitan war, was placed in command in those waters, and he detailed a young naval officer, Captain Oliver Hazard Perry, of Rhode Island, to take charge of a flotilla to act against a British fleet on Lake Erie. Perry was born in 1785, became a midshipman in 1799, and, like Chauncey, had served with credit in the Tripolitan war.

Theodore Roosevelt’s spirited account of this action is not only interesting as a historical narrative, but is also of special value for its critical analysis and comparative estimate of an exploit that for almost a century has been regarded as one of the chief glories of the United States Navy.

CAPTAIN OLWER HAZARD PERRY had assumed command of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under Commodore Chauncey. With intense energy he at once began creating a naval force which should be able to contend successfully with the foe. The latter in the beginning had exclusive control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had captured the Caledonia brig, and purchased three schooners, afterward named the Somers, Tigress, and Ohio, and a sloop, the Trippe. These at first were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort George and the retreat of the British forces Captain Perry was enabled to get them out, tacking them up against the current by the most arduous labor. They ran up to Presqu’tle (now called Erie), where two twenty-gun brigs were being constructed under the directions of the indefatigable captain. Three other schooners, the Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, were also built.

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious but had a bar on which there was less than seven feet of water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs from getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been appointed commander of the British forces on Lake Erie; and he was having built at Amherstburg a twenty-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded Perry’s force, and as the brigs could not cross the bar, with their guns in, or except in smooth water, they of course could not do so in his presence. He kept a close blockade for some time; but on August 2nd he disappeared. Perry at once hurried forward everything; and on the 4th, at 2 P.M., one brig, the Lawrence, was towed to that point of the bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig got over the bar by a hastily improvised "camel."

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of massive timber had been run through the forward and after ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water’s edge the ends of the timbers were blocked up, supported by these floating foundations. The plugs were now put in the scows, and the water was pumped out of them. By this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, though when she was got on the bar it was found that she still drew too much water. It became necessary, in consequence, to cover up everything, sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers afresh. This duty occupied the whole night."

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 A.M. on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too late; Captain Barclay exchanged a few shots with the schooners and then drew off. The Niagara crossed without difficulty. There were still not enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. The squadron sailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy, whose ship was now ready. After cruising about some time the Ohio was sent down the lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. On September 9th Captain Barclay put out from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions that he felt compelled to risk an action with the superior force opposed. On September 10th his squadron was discovered from the masthead of the Lawrence in the northwest. Before going into details of the action we will examine the force of the two squadrons, as the accounts vary considerably.

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, we know exactly; they having been all carefully appraised and measured by the builder, Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea captains. We also know the dimensions of the American ships. The Lawrence and Niagara measured 480 tons apiece. The Caledonia brig was about the size of the Hunter, or 180 tons. The Tigress, Somers, and Scorpion were subsequently captured by the foe, and were then said to measure respectively 96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were larger than similar boats on Lake Ontario. The Ariel was about the size of the Hamilton; the Porcupine and Trippe about the size of the Asp and Pert. As for the guns, Captain Barclay in his letter gives a complete account of those on board his squadron. He has also given a complete account of the American guns, which is most accurate, and, if anything, under estimates them. At least Emmons in his History gives the Trippe a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 24; and Lossing in his Field Book says (but I do not know on what authority) that the Caledonia had three long 24’S, while Barclay gives her two long 24’S and one 32-pound carronade; and that the Somers had two long 32’S, while Barclay gives her one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade. I shall take Barclay’s account, which corresponds with that of Emmons; the only difference being that Emmons puts a 24-pounder on the Scorpion and a 32 on the Trippe, while Barclay reverses this. I shall also follow Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24.

It is more difficult to give the strength of the respective crews. James says the Americans had 580, all "picked men." They were just as much picked men as Barclay’s were, and no more; that is, the ships had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing says he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names." In Volume xiv, page 566, of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize moneys owing to each man (or to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grand total of 532 men, including 136 on the Lawrence and 155 on the Niagara, 45 of whom were volunteers-frontiersmen. Deducting these we get 487 men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons’s 490. Possibly Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volunteers; and it may be that some of the men whose names were down on the prize list had been so sick that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yarnall testified before a court of inquiry in 1815 that there were but 131 men and boys of every description on board the Lawrence in the action; and the Niagara was said to have had but 140.

Lieutenant Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the Lawrence were fit for duty"; as Captain Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfit for duty, this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow the prize-money list; at any rate the difference in number is so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or landsmen from among the surrounding inhabitants; 158 were marines, or soldiers (I do not know which, as the list gives marines, soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to tell which of the two former heads includes the last); and 329 were officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of the total number there were on the day of action, according to Perry’s report, 116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the Lawrence, 28 on board the Niagara, and 57 on the small vessels.

All the later American writers put the number of men in Barclay’s fleet precisely at 502, but I have not been able to find the original authority. James (Naval Occurrences, page 289) says the British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-General E. Bayne, November 24, 1813, states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay’s squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the remainder (178) captured; and James himself on a previous page (284) states that there were 102 Canadians on Barclay’s vessels, not counting the Detroit, and we know that Barclay originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors from the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors came up from the Dover. James gives at the end of his Naval Occurrences some extracts from the court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieutenant Thomas Stokes, of the Queen Charlotte, there testified that he had on board "between 120 and 130 men, officers and all together," of whom "16 came up from the Dover three days before." James (on page 284) says her crew already consisted of 110 men; adding these 16 gives us 126-almost exactly "between 120 and 130." Lieutenant Stokes also testified that the Detroit had more men on account of being a larger and heavier vessel; to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier guns and larger size would at least need 24 men more than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the Lady Prevost 76, Hunter 39, Little Belt 15, and Chippeway 13 men, Canadians and soldiers, a total of 143; supposing that the number of British sailors placed on them was proportional to the amount placed on board the Queen Charlotte, we could add 21. This would make a grand total of 440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. This number is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as already quoted, says that there were aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded. Barday reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore have been sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore the same proportion to their whole number as in the case of the soldiers, there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in all 469 men. It can thus be said with certainty that there were between 440 and 490 men aboard, and I shall take the former number, though I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is not a point of very much importance, as the battle was fought largely at long range, where the number of men, provided there were plenty to handle the sails and guns, did not much matter.

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was nearly as three is to two, and in carronade metal greater than two to one. The chief fault to be found in the various American accounts is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal, while carefully specifying the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says, "Barclay had 35 long guns to Perry’s 15, and possessed greatly the advantage in action at a distance"; which he certainly did not. The tonnage of the fleets is not so very important. It is, I suppose, impossible to tell exactly the number of men in the two crews. Barclay almost certainly had more than the 440 men I have given him, but in all likelihood some of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his effectives was most probably somewhat less than Perry’s. As the battle was fought in such smooth water, and part of the time at long range, this, as already said, does not much matter. The Niagara might be considered a match for the Detroit, and tee Lawrence and Caledonia for the five other British vessels; so the Americans were certainly very greatly superior in force.

At daylight on September 10th Barclay’s squadron was discovered in the northwest, and Perry at once got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to the northeast, giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very light.. Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to the southwest, in the following order: Chippeway, Master’s Mate J. Campbell; Detroit, Captain R. H. Barclay; Hunter, Lieutenant G. Biguell; Queen Charlotte, Captain R. Linnis; Lady Prevost, Lieutenant Edward Buchan; and Little Belt, by whom commanded is not said. Perry came down with the wind on his port beam, and made the attack in column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the Ariel, Lieutenant John H. Packet; and Scorpion, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin, both being on the weather bow of the Lawrence, Captain O. H. Perry; next came the Caledonia, Lieutenant Daniel Turner; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. Elliott; Somers, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin; Porcupine, Acting Master George Serrat; Tigress, Sailing-Master Thomas C. Almy, and Trippe, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup.²

As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the American squadron approached the enemy, Perry’s straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen degrees with the more compact one of his foes. At 11.45 the Detroit opened the action by a shot from her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50 she fired a second, which went crashing through the Lawrence, and was replied to by the Scorpion’s long 32. At 11.55 the Lawrence, having shifted her port bowchaser, opened with both the long 12’S, and at meridian began with her carronades, but the shot from the latter all fell short. At the same time the action became general on both sides, though the rearmost American vessels were almost beyond the range of their own guns, and quite out of range of the guns of their antagonists. Meanwhile the Lawrence was already suffering considerably as she bore down on the enemy. It was twenty minutes before she succeeded in getting within good carronade range, and during that time the action at the head of the line was between the long guns of the Chippeway and Detroit, throwing 123 pounds, and those of the Scorpion, Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing 104 pounds. As the enemy’s fire was directed almost exclusively at the Lawrence, she suffered a great deal.

The Caledonia, Niagara, and Somers were meanwhile engaging, at long range, the Hunter and Queen Charlotte, opposing from their long guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while from a distance the three other American gun-vessels engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By 12.20 the Lawrence had worked down to close quarters, and at 12.30 the action was going on with great fury between her and her antagonists, within canister range. The raw and inexperienced American crews committed the same fault the British so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their carronades. In consequence, that of the Scorpion upset down the hatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the Detroit were dotted with marks from shot that did not penetrate. One of the Ariel’s long 12’s also burst. Barclay fought the Detroit exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently aimed, though they actually had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes, so deficient was the ship s equipment.

Meanwhile the Caledonia came down too, but the Niagara was wretchedly handled, Elliott keeping at a distance which prevented the use either of his carronades or of those of the Queen Charlotte, his antagonist; the latter, however, suffered greatly from the long guns of the opposing schooners, and lost her gallant commander, Captain Linnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were killed early in the action. Her next in command, Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no good, passed the Hunter and joined in the attack on the Lawrence, at close quarters. The Niagara, the most efficient and best manned of the American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action by her captain’s misconduct. At the end of the line, the fight went on at long range between the Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and Trippe on one side, and Little Belt and Lady Prevost on the other; the Lady Prevost making a very noble fight, although her 12-pound carronades rendered her almost helpless against the long guns of the Americans. She was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely, wounded, and she began falling gradually to leeward.

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody to an extraordinary degree. The Scorpion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of them handled with the most determined courage, were opposed to the Chippeway, Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, which were fought to the full as bravely. At such close quarters the two sides engaged on about equal terms, the Americans being superior in weight of metal and inferior in number of men. But the Lawrence had received such damage in working down as to make the odds against Perry. On each side almost the whole fire was directed at the opposing large vessel or vessels; in consequence the Queen Charlotte was almost disabled, and the Detroit was also frightfully shattered, especially by the raking fire of the gunboats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being mortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he was obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of Lieutenant George Inglis. But on board the Lawrence matters had gone even worse, the combined fire of her adversaries having made the grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were fit for duty when she began the action, 83, or over four-fifths, were killed or wounded. The vessel was shallow, and the wardroom, used as a cockpit to which the wounded were taken, was mostly above water, and the shot came through it continually, killing and wounding many men under the hands of the surgeon.

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times wounded, but kept to the deck through all; the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks of the marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline was shot away, and the brig almost completely dismantled; her hull was shattered to pieces, many shot going completely through it, and the guns on the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry kept up the fight with splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one, the Captain called down through the skylight for one of the surgeon’s assistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till none was left; then he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope?" and three or four of them crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effective heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and the chaplain. A man who did not possess his indomitable spirit would then have struck. Instead, although failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined to win by new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly.

Turner, in the Caledonia, when ordered to close, had put his helm up, run down on the opposing line, and engaged at very short range, though the brig was absolutely without quarters. The Niagara had thus become the next in line astern of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having passed the three schooners in front of her, was next ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze, steered for the head of Barclay’s line, passing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the Lawrence on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far taken very little part in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping into a rowboat, with his brother and four seamen, he rowed to the fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, and at once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the three schooners. The Trippe was now very near the Caledonia. The Lawrence, having but fourteen sound men left, struck her colors, but could not be taken possession of before the action recommenced. She drifted astern, the Caledonia passing between her and her foes. At 2.45, the schooners having closed up, Perry in his fresh vessel bore up to break Barclay’s line.

The British ships had fought themselves to a standstill. The Lady Prevost was crippled and sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. The Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled that they could not effectually oppose flesh antagonists. There could thus be but little resistance to Perry, as the Niagara stood down and broke the British line, firing her port guns into the Chippeway, Little Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the starboard ones into the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, raking on both sides. Too disabled to tack, the Detroit and Charlotte tried to wear, the latter running up to leeward of the former; and, both vessels having every brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell foul. The Niagara luffed athwart their bows, within half-pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and musketry, while on the other side the British vessels were raked by the Caledonia and the schooners so closely that some of their grapeshot, passing over the foe, rattled through Perry’s spars. Nothing further could be done, and Barclay’s flag was struck at 3 P.M., after three and a quarter hours’ most gallant and desperate fighting. The Chippeway and Little Belt tried to escape, but were overtaken and brought-to respectively by the Trippe and Scorpion, the commander of the latter, Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the first shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has behaved in the most humane and attentive manner, not only to myself and officers, but to all the wounded," writes Captain Barclay.

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material results and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of all the upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves, and insured the conquest of Upper Canada; in all these respects its importance has not been over-rated. But the "glory" acquired by it most certainly has been estimated at more than its worth. Most Americans, even the well educated, if asked which was the most glorious victory of the war, would point to this battle. Captain Perry’s name is more widely known than that of any other commander. Every schoolboy reads about him, if of no other sea captain; yet he certainly stands on a lower grade than either Hull or Macdonough, and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erie our seamen displayed great courage and skill; but so did their antagonists. The simple truth is that, where on both sides the officers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side which possessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to two, could not well help winning. The courage with which the Lawrence was defended has hardly ever been surpassed and may fairly be called heroic; but equal praise belongs to the men on board the Detroit, who had to discharge the great guns by flashing pistols at the touchholes, and yet made such a terribly effective defence. Courage is only one of the many elements which go to make up the character of a first-class commander; something more than bravery is needed before a leader can be really called great.

There happened to be circumstances which rendered the bragging of our writers over the victory somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well as can be ascertained from the conflicting evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough to work the guns and handle the ships, especially as the fight was in smooth water and largely at long range. The important fact was that, though we had nine guns less, yet at a broadside they threw half as much metal again as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our favor it would have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The water was too smooth for our two brigs to show at their best; but this very smoothness rendered our gunboats more formidable than any of the British vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous that it was to them the defeat was primarily due.

The American fleet came into action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry having formed his line badly or else to his having failed to train the subordinate commanders how to keep their places. The Niagara was not fought well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that prevented her from doing any damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered to pieces by the gun-boats without the chance of replying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels at the rear of the line should have been closer up and in a position to render more effectual assistance; the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether it was the fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to reflect credit on the Americans. Cooper as usual praises all concerned, but in this instance not with very good judgment. He says the line of battle was highly judicious, but this may be doubted. The weather was peculiarly suitable for the gunboats, with their long, heavy guns; and yet the line of battle was so arranged as to keep them in the rear and let the brunt of the assault fall on the Lawrence with her short carronades. Cooper again praises Perry’ for steering for the head of the enemy’s line, but he could hardly have done anything else.

In this battle the firing seems to have been equally skilful on both sides, the Detroit’s long guns being peculiarly well served; but the British captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first, and supported one another better, so that the disparity in damage done on each side was not equal to the disparity in force. The chief merit `of the American commander and his followers was indomitable courage and determination to not be beaten. This is no slight merit; but it may well be doubted if it would have insured victory had Barclay’s force been as strong as Perry’s. Perry made a headlong attack; his superior force-whether through his fault or his misfortune can hardly be said-being brought into action in such a manner that the head of the line was crushed by the inferior force opposed. Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry brought up its powerful twin sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close of the battle, and which insured the capture of all the opposing ships, were unquestionably very fine.

The British ships were fought as resolutely as their antagonists, not being surrendered till they were crippled and helpless, and almost all the officers, and a large proportion of the men placed hors de combat. Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the latter’s force was of such a nature that in smooth water his gunboats gave him a great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron. In short our victory was due to our heavy metal.

As regards the honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has given rise to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon as in an equally high degree creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the victory was so complete, it might be said that the length of the contest and the trifling disparity in loss reflected rather the most credit on the British. Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances; but his claim to fame rests muth less on his actual victory than on the way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it. Here his energy and activity deserve all praise, not only for his success in collecting sailors and vessels, and in building the two brigs, but above all for the manner in which he succeeded in getting them out on the lake. On that occasion he certainly out generalled Barclay; indeed, the latter committed an error that the skill and address he subsequently showed could not retrieve.

¹From Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval war of 1812 (G. P. Putnam’s Sons), by permission.

²The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. Barclay’s letter is a model of its kind for candor and generosity. Letters of Capt. R. H. Barclay to Sir James Yeo, September 2, 1813; of Lieut. Inglis to Captain Barclay, September 10th; of Captain Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, September 10th and September 13th, and to General Harrison, September 11th and September 13th. I have relied mainly on Lossing’s Field Book of the Wa, of 1812, on Commander Ward’s Naval Tactics, page 76, and on Cooper’s Naval History.