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General SummaryThe official documents relating to the outbreak of the war in 1914 were soon published and are accessible in English translations. It is well to remember that they were specially prepared for publication; furthermore, that they cannot give adequate information of the personal factor which is so important in all diplomatic matters. There is no reason, however, to doubt the authenticity of this diplomatic correspondence, which the various European governments have presented to the world. The letters and dispatches printed in the British White Book, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Book, the Belgian Gray Book, the French Yellow Book, the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, and the Serbian Blue Book confirm one another’s statements in a remarkable manner.
Historical SummaryThe issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipitated a crisis. The peace of Europe was gravely threatened. Russia, the greatest of Slavic nations, whose interest in the Balkans was well known, could not regard without concern the crushing of a smaller Slavic state. But if Russia intervened to protect Serbia, by making war on Austria-Hungary, then Germany, as the latter’s ally, would surely attack Russia, and France, bound to Russia in firm alliance, would be obliged to attack Germany. To prevent the catastrophe of a general European war, peace parleys began at once. The most important suggestion was made by Sir Edward Grey, the British minister for foreign affairs. He proposed that the four powers not directly interested in the dispute, namely, Germany, France, Italy, and England, should mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Austria-Hungary, however, refused to accept any outside interference in settling what it regarded as a private quarrel with Serbia. The Austrian declaration of war against Serbia on July 28 was followed on the same day by the beginning of Russian mobilization. On the evening of the 28th the kaiser, who had returned to Berlin from a holiday in Norway, sent the following telegram to his cousin, the tsar: To this telegram the tsar, early in the morning of July 29, replied as follows: Later in the same day the kaiser sent this message to the tsar: A few hours later, on the morning of July 30, the kaiser sent another message, stronger in tone. The tsar, on the afternoon of July 30, made this answer: The situation quickly became acute. The two rulers exchanged further telegrams without result, since Russia refused to discontinue military preparations as long as Austria-Hungary was actually at war with Serbia. On the night of July 31 the German government sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding demobilization of the Russian army, in default of which Germany would herself mobilize. Having received no answer to the ultimatum, Germany on August 1 declared war against Russia.
172. Dispatches Between Kaiser and Tsar1
I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression
which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against
Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for
years in Serbia, has led to the revolting crime of which the archduke
Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which
made the Serbians murder their own king and his consort still
dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me
that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a
common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for
this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.
On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty
encountered by you and your government to stem the tide
of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has
joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire
influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and
satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently
that you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties
which may yet arise.
I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious
moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war
has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the
indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very
soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me
and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war.
To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge
you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all in your power to
restrain your ally from going too far.
I have received your telegram and I share your desire for
the preservation of peace. However, I cannot — as I told you in
my first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary
as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience
that the promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely
on paper, are entirely unreliable.
According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is
to be considered as an attempt to receive full guarantee that the
promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In
this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian
cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial
gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that
it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the
Austro-Serbian war, without drawing Europe into the most
terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding
is possible and desirable between your government
and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already telegraphed
you — my government endeavors to aid with all possible
effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might
be construed as menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate
a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine
my position as mediator, which — upon your appeal to my
friendship and aid — I willingly accepted.
My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of
your government to the dangers and serious consequences of a
mobilization. I have told you the same in my last telegram.
Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia, and only
a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according
to your advice and that of your government, mobilizes
against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator with which
you have intrusted me in such friendly manner and which I
have accepted upon your express desire, is threatened, if not
made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon
your shoulders: you have to bear the responsibility for war or
peace.
I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending
to-night Tatishev (Russian honorary aide to the kaiser)
with instructions. The military measures now taking form
were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense
against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart
that these measures will not influence in any manner your position
as mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need
your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can
be arrived at with us.
1 , exhibits Nos. 20–23a.
Chicago: German White Book in Readings in Modern European History, ed. Webster, Hutton (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1926), 435–436. Original Sources, accessed April 19, 2024, http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=DESYZEP2YVXMDVX.
MLA: . German White Book, in Readings in Modern European History, edited by Webster, Hutton, Boston, D.C. Heath, 1926, pp. 435–436. Original Sources. 19 Apr. 2024. http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=DESYZEP2YVXMDVX.
Harvard: , German White Book. cited in 1926, Readings in Modern European History, ed. , D.C. Heath, Boston, pp.435–436. Original Sources, retrieved 19 April 2024, from http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=DESYZEP2YVXMDVX.
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