Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)

Craig v. Boren

No. 75-628

Argued October 5, 1976
Decided December 20, 1976
429 U.S. 190

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Syllabus

Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws. Recognizing that Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, and later cases establish that classification by gender must substantially further important governmental objectives, a three-judge District Court held that appellees’ statistical evidence regarding young males’ drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads.

Held:

1. Since only declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the gender-based differential was sought, the controversy has been mooted as to Craig, who became 21 after this Court had noted probable jurisdiction. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312. P. 192.

2. Whitener has standing to make the equal protection challenge. Pp. 192-197.

(a) No prudential objective thought to be served by limitations of jus tertii standing can be furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the constitutional challenge and the parties have sought resolution of the constitutional issue. Pp. 193-194.

(b) Whitener in any event independently has established third-party standing. She suffers "injury in fact," since the challenged statutory provisions are addressed to vendors like her, who either must obey the statutory provisions and incur economic injury or disobey the statute and suffer sanctions. In such circumstances, vendors may resist efforts to restrict their operations by advocating the rights of third parties seeking access to their market. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438. Pp. 194-197.

3. Oklahoma’s gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Appellees’ statistics (the most relevant of which show only that .18% of females and 2% of males in the 18-20-year-old age group were arrested for driving while under the influence of liquor) do not warrant the conclusion that sex represents an accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving. Pp. 199-204.

4. The operation of the Twenty-first Amendment does not alter the application of equal protection standards that otherwise govern this case. The Court has never recognized that application of that Amendment can defeat an otherwise established claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the principles of which cannot be rendered inapplicable here by reliance upon statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups. Pp. 204-210.

399 F.Supp. 1304, reversed.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-D of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. POWELL, J., post, p. 210, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 211, filed concurring opinions. BLACKMUN, J., filed a statement concurring in part, post, p. 214. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 214. BURGER, C.J., post, p. 215, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 217, filed dissenting opinions.