Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101 (1912)
Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington
Nos. 505
, 776
Argued April 15, 16, 1912
Decided May 27, 1912
225 U.S. 101
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
AND THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
In cases of intervention in foreclosure suits, where jurisdiction depends upon diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of the intervening petition is determined by that of the original case, but petitions in original proceedings to enforce rights and protect the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court take their jurisdiction from that of the original case. St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 217 U.S. 247.
Where the petition of the receiver, appointed in a case dependent on diverse citizenship, invokes the jurisdiction of the circuit court not only as ancillary to the receivership, but also to protect the estate on grounds involving alleged infractions of the federal Constitution and rights secured thereby, the case is not one in which the judgment of the circuit court of appeals is made final by the Act of 1891, and an appeal lies to this Court where the amount in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars
Where the case can be taken to the circuit court of appeals, the fact that it involves grounds that warrant a direct appeal to this Court does not deprive the circuit court of appeals of jurisdiction.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the national government has exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce, and any attempt by the state to regulate rates for interstate transportation is void. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27.
An order made by a state Commission under assumed authority of the state which directly burdens interstate commerce will be enjoined. McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U.S. 543.
A rate fixed on that part of interstate carriage which includes the actual placing of the shipment into vessels ready to be carried beyond the state destination is, as to merchandise intended for points beyond the state, a burden on interstate commerce, and beyond the power of the State to impose, even if the merchandise is billed from a point within the state to the point where the vessel is. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403, distinguished.
Through billing to the point beyond the state is not always necessary to determine that a shipment is interstate. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Young, 219 U.S. 498.
A rate fixed by the Ohio Railroad Commission for coal from state points to "on board" vessels at the port of Huron, Ohio, and intended for shipment to some point beyond the state undetermined at time of shipment, and, for convenience, billed to the shippers’ own order at Huron, held to be a rate affecting interstate shipment, and void under the commerce clause of the Constitution as a attempt to regulate interstate commerce.
Quaere whether transportation under the circumstances of this case is such a transportation within the state or to points without the state, partly by railroad and partly by water, as to be within the jurisdiction and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
187 F. 965 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission of the State of Ohio fixing and establishing a rate on "lake cargo coal" and whether such order was void as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.