Article Signed "Vindex."

[Boston Gazette, January 8, 1770.] —"And the Governor for the time being shall have full power and authority from time to time as he shall judge necessary, to adjourn, prorogue and dissolve all Great and General Courts or Assemblies met and conven’d as aforesaid."—1

THE power delegated by this clause to the Governor was undoubtedly intended in favor of the people—The necessity and importance of a legislative in being, and of its having the opportunity of exerting itself upon all proper occasions, must be obvious to a man of common discernment. Its grand object is the REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES: And for this purpose it is adjudg’d that parliaments ought to be held frequently—The people may be aggriev’d for the want of having a good law made, as well as repealing a bad one: So they may be, by the mal conduct of the executive in its manner of administring justice wrongfully under colour of law. In all these cases and many others, the necessity of the frequent interposition of the legislative evidently appears. And if either of them, much more, if all of them should at any time be justly complain’d of by the people, the adjourning, proroguing or dissolving the legislative, at such a juncture, must be the greatest of all grievances—There may be other reasons for the sitting of an American assembly besides the correcting any disorders arising from among the people within its own jurisdiction.—Some of the Acts of the British parliament are generally thought to be grievous in their operation, and dangerous in their consequences to the liberties of the American subjects: An American legislative therefore, in which the whole body of the people is represented, ought certainly to have the opportunity of explaining and remonstrating their grievances to the British parliament, and the full exercise of that invaluable and uncontroulable Right of the subject to petition the King, as often as they judge necessary, ’till they are removed. To postpone a meeting of this universal body of the people till it is too late to make such application must be a frustration of one grand design of its existance; and it naturally tends to other arbitrary exertions.—I have often tho’t that in former administrations such delays to call the general assembly, were intended for the purpose above-mentioned: And if others should have the same apprehension at present I cannot help it, nor am I answerable for it. It may not be amiss however for every man to make it a subject of his contemplation. We all remember that no longer ago than the last year, the extraordinary dissolution by Governor Bernard, in which he declared he was merely ministerial, produced another assembly, which tho’ legal in all its proceedings, awaked an attention in the very soul of the British empire.

It is not to be expected that in ordinary times, much less at such an important period as this is, any man, tho’ endowed with the wisdom of Solomon, at the distance of three thousand miles, can be an adequate judge of the expediency of proroguing, and in effect even putting an end to an American legislative assembly; and more especially at a time when the evil spirit of Misrepresentation is become so atrocious, that even M. . .y itself is liable to be wrongly informed!—It is for this reason that the delegation of this power to the governor for the time being, appears to be intended in favor of the people: That there might be always at the head of the province, and resident therein, as the charter provides, a person of untainted integrity, candor, impartiality and wisdom, to judge of and determine so essential a point—A point, in which I should think, no person who justly deserves this character, can be passive or merely ministerial, against his own judgment and conscience. Whenever therefore a Governor for the time being, adjourns, prorogues or dissolves the general assembly, having the full power and authority delegated to him of judging from time to time of the Necessity of it, we ought to presume that he exercises that power with freedom: That he determines according to the light of his own understanding, and not anothers: That he clearly sees that it will answer those purposes which he himself judges to be best; having, as a man of fidelity in his station ought, thoro’ly revolv’d the matter in his own mind: And, that however flattering the concurrent sentiments of any other man may be, he would have been impelled to do it, from the dictates of his own judgment, resulting from his own contemplation of the matter, if he had not received the "express command of his superior." Such a man "will bravely act his mind, and venture—Death."

VINDEX.

1B. P. Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, 1878, vol. i., p. 949. vol. ii.—i.