|
|
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993)
Contents:
Show Summary
Hide Summary
General SummaryThis case is from a collection containing the full text of over 16,000 Supreme Court cases from 1793 to the present. The body of Supreme Court decisions are, effectively, the final interpretation of the Constitution. Only an amendment to the Constitution can permanently overturn an interpretation and this has happened only four times in American history.
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993)
McNeil v. United States No. 92-6033 Argued April 19, 1993 Decided May 17, 1993 508 U.S. 106
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Four months after petitioner McNeil, proceeding without counsel, filed this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit for money damages arising from his alleged injury by the United States Public Health Service, he submitted a claim for such damages to the Department of Health and Human Services, which promptly denied the claim. The District Court subsequently dismissed McNeil’s complaint as premature under an FTCA provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), which requires that a claimant exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, although decisions in other Circuits have permitted a prematurely filed FTCA action to proceed if no substantial progress has taken place in the litigation before the administrative remedies are exhausted.
Held: An FTCA action may not be maintained when the claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, but did so before substantial progress was made in the litigation. Section 2675(a)’s unambiguous text -- which commands that an
action shall not be instituted . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate . . . agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency
-- requires rejection of McNeil’s contention that his action was timely because it was commenced when he lodged his complaint with the District Court. The complaint was filed too early, since McNeil’s claim had not previously been presented to the Public Health Service nor "finally denied" by that agency. Also unpersuasive is McNeil’s argument that his action was timely because it should be viewed as having been "instituted" on the date when his administrative claim was denied. In its statutory context, the normal interpretation of the word "institute" is synonymous with the words "begin" and "commence." The most natural reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is certainly not a "trap for the unwary." Pp. 110-113.
964 F.2d 647, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Contents:
Chicago: U.S. Supreme Court, "Syllabus," McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) in 508 U.S. 106 508 U.S. 107. Original Sources, accessed November 22, 2024, http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=TK22IQW2KWXNKSL.
MLA: U.S. Supreme Court. "Syllabus." McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993), in 508 U.S. 106, page 508 U.S. 107. Original Sources. 22 Nov. 2024. http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=TK22IQW2KWXNKSL.
Harvard: U.S. Supreme Court, 'Syllabus' in McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). cited in 1993, 508 U.S. 106, pp.508 U.S. 107. Original Sources, retrieved 22 November 2024, from http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=TK22IQW2KWXNKSL.
|