Designs on Cuba (1825)

BY MINISTER ALEXANDER HILL EVERETT

MADRID, Nov. 30, 1825.

. . . I THINK it proper to make you acquainted with one circumstance in my intercourse with this Government of rather a delicate nature which I have not introduced into my despatches on account of their being liable to be called for and published at any moment. It occurred in my communications with the Minister upon our relations with the island of Cuba.

It has always appeared to me, and such I believe is the general opinion in the United States, that this island forms properly an appendage of the Floridas. Since the cession of these provinces an impression has generally prevailed throughout the country that Cuba must at one time or another belong to us. Indeed this idea was entertained, as I have been told, by many persons of the highest respectability, including Mr. Jefferson, long before the conclusion of the Florida treaty. It grows naturally out of a consideration of the Geographical position of the island as respects the United States. In the hands of a powerful and active nation, it would carry with it so complete a control over the commerce of the Gulph of Mexico, and over the navigation of the River Mississippi, as to endanger very much the intercourse of our country in that quarter. Our safety from this danger has, I believe, long been considered as resulting wholly from the feebleness and insufficiency of Spain; and it has been viewed by all as a settled point that the American Government could not consent to any change in the political situation of Cuba other than one which should place it under the jurisdiction of the United States. This view of the subject is strongly intimated in my official instructions. Such are the first considerations that present themselves in regard to our relations with the island of

Cuba. The next in order are that it is impossible, in fact, — in consequence of the internal state of the island, the obstinate adherence of Spain to the Colonial System, and the growing strength of the new States, — that the island can remain in its present situation. It may be assumed as certain that the war will be continued by Spain for an indefinite period. Half a century may very probably elapse before she recognizes the independence of the colonies. On the other hand, it is quite evident, and such is the opinion of the Government as expressed in my instructions, that as long as the war is kept up, the situation of the island is in the highest degree precarious, that it is liable to be changed every year, every month even, and that it cannot remain as it is more than two or three years. The white inhabitants form too small a proportion of the whole number to constitute of themselves an independent State. The island, therefore, must assume, whenever it changes its present condition, one of two others. It must either fall into the hands of some power different from Spain, as probably Mexico or Colombia, or it must become an independent principality of blacks. Neither part of this alternative can be considered as admissible, and a view of our present relations with the island presents, therefore, the following results:

1st. The situation of the island must inevitably be changed within z or 3 years, and may be changed at any moment.

2d. No change can possibly occur without the intervention of the United States which they could regard as admissible.

From these premises, it seems to follow, as a necessary conclusion, that it is the policy and duty of the United States to endeavor to obtain possession of the island immediately in a peaceable way. If they do not succeed in this, it is morally certain that they will be forced, at no very distant period, to effect the same object in a more invidious manner, and at the risk of embroiling themselyes with some of the great powers of Europe. The principal question, therefore, is, whether any consideration could be presented to the Spanish Ministry of a nature to induce them to cede the island. If this were possible, it would appear to be the policy of the United States to commence the negotiation without delay. Viewing the subject in this light, and recollecting at the same time the great financial embarrassments under which this Government is now laboring, it has occurred to me that the offer of a considerable loan, on condition of a temporary cession of the island in deposit as security for the payment of it, would be as likely to succeed as any proposition that could be made upon the subject. The interest might be made payable out of the revenues of the island, which are said to amount to between four and five millions of dollars, and if the money were not paid within a pretty long limited time, complete sovereignty might vest in the United States. Considering the character of the Spanish Government, and their general system of administration, a cession of this kind, accompanied with an immediate delivery of possession, would be equivalent, as respects us, to a direct cession of the whole sovereignty. In the view of the Spanish Government, it might perhaps wear a more agreeable aspect. It would present to them the two following great advantages:

1st. The obtaining of a loan sufficient to meet their immediate wants on good terms, — a thing which seems to be absolutely indispensable, which there is apparently no possibility of effecting in any other way, on any terms, and which, if in reality effected in any other way, must be a transaction, prudentially considered, of the most desperate character. This advantage is by no means a light one, since it seems impossible even to imagine how this Government can get along six months without new resources.

2d. The second advantage would be the assurance of retaining the island in the event of repaying the loan. Whatever confidence this Government may affect in the results of their colonial system, it is impossible that they should not be aware to a certain extent of the great danger to which they are exposed of losing the islands. They may not be so fully satisfied, as most foreigners probably are, of the moral impossibility that they would be able to pay down 15 or 20 millions of dollars twenty years hence, and might, therefore, regard a transaction of this kind as considerably increasing their assurance of a continued possession of Cuba. Such, in fact, would be the probable effect of it, if we suppose the Spanish Government, notwithstanding their affected determination never to surrender their rights, to intend, nevertheless, in secret to recognize the colonies after a few years, should things go on in their present course. Supposing this to be their policy, they would obtain, by ceding the island to us in the way I have suggested, a complete assurance of the continued possession of it from the moment when the delivery to the United States was effected. This temporary transfer would secure it from the danger of attack or internal convulsion while it lasted, and upon the recognition of the colonies, Spain would without difficulty obtain from them a much larger indemnity in money than would be necessary to ransom the island. It is not, however, probable that Spare now intends to recognize the colonies at no very distant period, and I have already assumed that she does not. These considerations might, nevertheless, be presented to her, and, being extremely obvious and cogent, might perhaps make an impression.

But, supposing this Government, as I do, to be completely resolved Upon adhering to their system, and yet aware of the danger of losing the island, and of the impossibility of ever repaying a loan of the kind mentioned without recognizing the colonies, they might yet think it better to get 20 millions for the island than to lose it for nothing.

Such are the advantages of the transaction as respects Spain. As respects the United States, it holds out the two following, which are so obvious that I need not enlarge upon them:

1st. Complete security from the danger of any change in the position of the island in consequence of the present troubles.

2d. The probability of an eventual acquisition of the entire sovereignty.

It may perhaps be thought that some of the great foreign powers, particularly England or France, would take umbrage at the acquisition by us of the sovereignty of Cuba; that the probability of this ought to prevent us from taking any measure to obtain it, and that it would, at any rate, hinder Spain from ceding it to us directly or indirectly.

The weight of this objection, you are, of course, better able to appreciate than I am. It does not strike me that the foreign powers ought to feel, or would, in fact, feel, the same repugnance to our occupying Cuba as we should to their doing it; and if we consider the acquisition of the island by a peaceable transaction as the only means of avoiding the necessity of taking possession of it sooner or later by force, — which is the view I have taken of the subject, — it is evident that the repugnance of the foreign powers, whatever it may be, is no real objection, because it must in the end be met. They would probably be much more dissatisfied to see us occupy the island by force than to see us acquire it by purchase.

These considerations appear to me to recommend very powerfully the policy of endeavoring to acquire the island of Cuba in a peaceable way, and the manner I have indicated seems the one which would be the most likely to succeed. I should not, of course, think of making any formal proposition on the subject without receiving your instructions; and should the suggestions I have now made appear to be of a nature to be acted on seriously, you will have the goodness to favor me with your orders, either through the Department of State, or in a private letter, as you may think most expedient. I have thought, however, that there would be no impropriety in sounding the intentions of the Government beforehand in an informal way, and I accordingly took an opportunity of doing it in one of the conversations I had with Mr. Zea. . . .

, April, 1876 (New York), XI, 877̵879.