United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964)

United States v. Healy

No. 64

Argued January 6, 1964
Decided February 17, 1964
376 U.S. 75

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Syllabus

1. An indictment was dismissed by the District Court before trial based upon the construction of the statute upon which the indictment was founded. The Government filed notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of the petition for rehearing, but more than 30 days after the entry of the original judgment. Under Rule 11(2) of this Court, a criminal appeal from a district court to this Court must be filed within 30 days after entry of "the judgment or order" appealed from, and appellees contended that the filing of a petition for rehearing without authorization by statute or rule cannot extend the time for appeal.

Held: the timely filing of a petition for a rehearing in a criminal case, no less than in a civil case, renders the judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal until the court disposes of the petition, and, in such an instance, the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 11(2) begins to run from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing. Pp. 77-80.

2. Appellees were indicted under tuo counts for forcing at gunpoint the pilot of a private airplane to transport them from Florida to Cuba. One count, under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, for kidnaping, was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the kidnaping was not "for ransom or reward or otherwise" unless committed for the pecuniary benefit of the defendant.

Held: the statute, as Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, plainly held, is not confined to kidnapings for pecuniary gain, nor need the underlying purpose for which the kidnaping is done be an illegal one in order for the statute to apply. Pp. 81-82.

3. The other count, under § 902(i) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended in 1961, for "aircraft piracy," was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that a private airplane is not "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" within the meaning of the statute.

Held: both the language of the statute and its legislative history manifest congressional intent to include private aircraft within the scope of § 902(i). Pp. 83-85.

Reversed and remanded.