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Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986)
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General SummaryThis case is from a collection containing the full text of over 16,000 Supreme Court cases from 1793 to the present. The body of Supreme Court decisions are, effectively, the final interpretation of the Constitution. Only an amendment to the Constitution can permanently overturn an interpretation and this has happened only four times in American history.
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986)
Lyng v. Castillo No. 85-250 Argued April 29, 1986 Decided June 27, 1986 477 U.S. 635
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Syllabus
Eligibility and benefit levels in the federal food stamp program are determined on a "household," rather than an individual, basis. The statutory definition of the term "household," as amended in 1981 and 1982, generally treats parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single household, but does not treat more distant relatives, or groups of unrelated persons who live together, as a single household unless they also customarily purchase food and prepare meals together. Appellees are families who generally buy their food and prepare their meals as separate economic units, and who will either lose benefits or have their food stamp allotment decreased as a result of the 1981 and 1982 amendments to the statute. They filed actions that were consolidated in Federal District Court, claiming that the statutory distinction between parents, children, and siblings and all other groups of individuals violates the guarantee of equal treatment in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court, applying "heightened scrutiny," invalidated the distinction.
Held: The statutory distinction is not unconstitutional. The District Court erred in judging its constitutionality under "heightened scrutiny," since close relatives are not a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class. The statutory distinction does not "directly and substantially" interfere with family living arrangements, and thereby burden a fundamental right. Judged under the proper standard of review, Congress had a rational basis for making the distinction, since it could reasonably determine that close relatives sharing a home tend to purchase and prepare meals together, while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be so inclined. Pp. 638-643.
Reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 643, WHITE, J., post, p. 643, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 643, filed dissenting opinions.
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Chicago: U.S. Supreme Court, "Syllabus," Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) in 477 U.S. 635 477 U.S. 636. Original Sources, accessed November 24, 2024, http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=R1E7KNPT9W29Z9K.
MLA: U.S. Supreme Court. "Syllabus." Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986), in 477 U.S. 635, page 477 U.S. 636. Original Sources. 24 Nov. 2024. http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=R1E7KNPT9W29Z9K.
Harvard: U.S. Supreme Court, 'Syllabus' in Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). cited in 1986, 477 U.S. 635, pp.477 U.S. 636. Original Sources, retrieved 24 November 2024, from http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=R1E7KNPT9W29Z9K.
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