Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930)
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Dohany v. Rogers
No. 338
Argued March 14, 1930
Decided April 14, 1930
281 U.S. 362
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Syllabus
1. Decisions of the state supreme court as to the propriety of condemnation proceedings under the state constitution and laws followed in a suit brought in the federal court to enjoin like condemnation proceedings involving the same project and contract. P. 365.
2. A state highway project included in the highway an adjacent railroad right of way, to be acquired from the railroad in exchange for other lands which the state was to condemn and upon which the railroad was to be relocated. Held that the taking of private land to be so exchanged is a taking for a public purpose. P. 365.
3. Requiring a landowner to surrender possession in condemnation proceedings before he is paid is not a denial of due process so long as payment is insured by the state. P. 366.
4. In a suit in the district court to enjoin proceedings whereby the State of Michigan sought to take private land in order to exchange it with a railroad company for other land desired by the state for highway purposes, the landowner claimed the right to have the proceeding brought under the Railway Condemnation Act, which allows consequential damages and damages without deduction of benefits, and that another statute, by authorizing condemnation under the Highway Condemnation Act, deprived him of these and other rights in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In view of decisions of the state supreme court in like cases, held that there is no ground for anticipating that just compensation will be denied in this instance, or that any advantages given by the Railway Act with respect to the amount of compensation for the land taken or the deduction of benefits will be withheld. P. 367.
5. Attorneys’ fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation for land taken by eminent domain. P. 368.
6. Allowing attorneys’ fees to landowners in condemnation proceedings brought by railroad companies but not in those brought by the state is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws. P. 368.
7. The due process clause does not guarantee to landowner the right of trial by jury in condemnation cases, nor the right of appeal. P. 369.
8. The equal protection clause permits of different procedure in condemnation suits brought by the state from that prescribed where the actor is a private corporation. P. 369.
9. A decree dismissing the bill in an injunction suit tried before three judges (Jud.Code, § 266) may properly be attested by one of the judges when authorized by opinions signed by all. P. 369.
33 F.2d 918 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court of three judges dismissing a bill for an injunction.