Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923)
Wagner Electric Manufacturing Company v. Lyndon
No. 738
Motion to dismiss submitted April 30, 1923
Decided May 21, 1923
262 U.S. 226
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
Syllabus
1. Where the district court dismissed a bill on the ground that the constitutional questions relied on were too unsubstantial to confer jurisdiction, without passing on defendant’s further objection that the bill sought to enjoin proceedings in a state court contrary to Jud.Code, § 265, the only appeal allowed by law was to this Court under Jud.Code, § 238, on the ground that the sole issues involved were those involving the application or construction of the Constitution or the jurisdiction of the district court. P. 230.
2. The Act of September 14, 1922, c. 305, 42 Stat. 837, providing that, if a case is taken, by appeal or writ of error, to the circuit court of appeals, which should have been taken to this Court, the appeal or writ of error shall not for that reason be dismissed, but shall be transferred to the proper court and there be disposed of as if the appeal or writ of error had been properly taken, was applicable to a case in which the circuit court of appeals had rendered a final decree of affirmance before the date of the act, but which remained pending before that court on a petition for rehearing. P. 230.
3. When a case from the district court which should have been brought here directly was taken to the circuit court of appeals, and then, by appeal from its decision, to this Court, and here submitted for decision on the merits, by a motion to dismiss or affirm and accompanying briefs, held that it was not necessary to remand it to the circuit court of appeals for transfer under the Act of September 14, 1922, supra, but that it might be treated as though it had been so transferred. P. 231.
4. The proposition that, in a collateral attack upon the validity of a judgment of a state court, a federal court can examine the evidence to see whether a direction by the court to a jury to find a verdict was justified by the evidence, is frivolous. P. 231.
5. The deprivation of a right of trial by jury in a state court does not deny the parties due process of law under the federal Constitution. P. 232.
6. When the state constitution provides that a court shall consist of four judges and that a majority thereof shall constitute a quorum, and review by four judges is given, and an opinion is rendered by three of them, constitution the quorum, the mere fact that the fourth did not hear the oral argument, but wrote the opinion on the printed arguments, is, at most, an irregularity which does not affect the validity of the judgment. P. 232.
7. Where the state constitution provided for a court in two divisions, and a case was disposed of by one of those divisions, and the losing party’s motion to transfer the case to the court in banc, because a federal question was involved and it was therefore under the state constitution entitled to a hearing by the full court, was denied, and the propriety of the decision in the state court was questioned in the federal court on this ground, held that the question of the right to the transfer was one of state law upon which the federal courts were bound to accept the decision of the state court. P. 232.
8. When the history of the case and the conduct of the appellant left no doubt that the litigation and successive appeals were prosecuted solely for delay and the case was dismissed by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the grounds of appeal were frivolous, the appellee was awarded $1,500 as damages for delay, and costs, as upon an affirmance of the decree of the district court. Rev.Stats., §§ 1010, 1012. P. 232.
Appeal to review 282 F. 219 dismissed.
Appeal from a decree of the circuit court of appeals affirming a decision of the district court which dismissed the bill in a suit to hold a sheriff as trustee of money paid under an execution issued on a judgment of a state court, and to enjoin him from paying it to the judgment creditor, Lyndon, and the latter from receiving it.