Stellwager v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918)
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Stellwager v. Clum
No. 89
Argued December 14, 1917
Decided February 4, 1918
245 U.S. 605
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
The Bankruptcy Act as it was on the dates herein mentioned (February 2, 1910, November 9, 1910) did not operate to suspend § 6343 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio as it stood February 2, 1910, or the sections into which that section was divided and numbered by the General Code of Ohio, approved February 15, 1910, viz: §§ 11102-11105, as such sections existed May 5, 1910.
The Ohio law, supra (part of a chapter concerning insolvent debtors), provides, among other things, that any transfer made by a debtor to prefer creditors, or with intent to hinder, delay or defraud them, shall, if the transferee knew of such fraudulent intent, be declared void at the suit of any creditor or creditors, and that a receiver may thereupon be appointed to take charge of all the debtor’s assets, including the property so transferred, and administer them for the equal benefit of all creditors in proportion to their respective demands. Held that such provisions are consistent with the Bankruptcy Law, and that, availing of them pursuant to § 70e of the latter, a trustee in bankruptcy proceedings, which followed within a few days of the debtor’s general assignment, could administer for the creditors generally property which had been transferred by the debtor in trust for particular creditors more than four months previously.
Bankruptcy laws enacted by Congress pursuant to Article I, § 8, of the Constitution operate to suspend the laws of states only insofar as the latter laws are in conflict with the system established by the former.
In determining whether a state law is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, much weight is to be given the consideration that a main purpose of the act, and a prime requisite of every true bankruptcy law, is to benefit the debtor by relieving his future acquired property from the obligations of existing debts.
Although different results may ensue therefrom in different states, it is not inconsistent with the requirement of uniformity for the federal bankruptcy law to permit trustees in bankruptcy to avail themselves of state statutes intended to avoid fraudulent conveyances, and thus promote the equal distribution of insolvent estates.
Section 70-e of the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee in bankruptcy a right to recover property transferred in violation of state law without reference to the four months’ limitation; if a creditor could have avoided the transfer under the state law, the trustee may do the same.
For opinion of the circuit court of appeals in re the certification, see 218 F. 730.
The case is stated in the opinion.