National Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Dept. Of Interior, 526 U.S. 86 (1999)

National Federation of Federal Employees , Local 1309

v. Department of Interior
No. 97-1184

Argued November 9, 1998
Decided March 3, 1999 *
526 U.S. 86

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

As relevant here, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute) requires federal agencies and their employees’ unions to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement," 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4); and creates the Federal Labor Relations Authority, giving it broad adjudicatory, policymaking, and rulemaking powers to implement the Statute, §§ 7104, 7105. The Authority initially held that § 7114(a)(4)’s good faith bargaining requirement does not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, and, in response, the Authority reversed its position. In this suit, a federal employees’ union proposed including in its basic contract with a subagency of the Department of the Interior (Agency) a provision obligating the Agency to negotiate at the union’s request, about mid-term matters not in the original contract. Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s view that union-initiated mid-term bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute, the Agency refused to accept, or bargain about, the proposed clause. However, the Authority ordered the Agency to bargain. The Fourth Circuit set aside that order, holding that the Statute prohibits such a provision.

Held: the Statute delegates to the Authority the legal power to determine whether parties must engage in mid-term bargaining or bargaining about mid-term bargaining. Pp. 91-101.

(a) The Statute itself does not resolve the mid-term bargaining question. Section 7114(a)(4)’s language is sufficiently ambiguous or open on the point as to require judicial deference to reasonable interpretation or elaboration by the agency charged with the Statute’s execution. Such ambiguity is inconsistent both with the Fourth Circuit’s absolute reading that the Statute prohibits mid-term bargaining and with the D.C. Circuit’s similarly absolute, but opposite, reading. It is perfectly consistent, however, with the conclusion that Congress delegated to the Authority the power to determine whether, when, where, and what sort of mid-term bargaining is required. This conclusion is supported by the Statute’s delegation of rulemaking, adjudicatory, and policymaking powers to the Authority, and by precedent recognizing the similarity of the Authority’s public sector and the National Labor Relations Board’s private sector roles, see Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97. Pp. 91-99.

(b) For similar reasons, the Statute also grants the Authority leeway in answering the question whether an agency must bargain end-term about including in the basic labor contract a mid-term bargaining clause. The Authority’s judgment that the parties must bargain over such a provision was occasioned by the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the Statute imposes a duty to bargain mid-term. Since the Statute does not resolve the question of mid-term bargaining, nor the related question of bargaining about mid-term bargaining, the Authority should have the opportunity to consider these questions aware that the Statute permits, but does not compel, the conclusions it reached. Pp. 99-101.

132 F.3d 157, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined, and in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Part I, post, p. 101.