CHAPTER XXIX
Garibaldi’s Campaigns
1
136.
Fall of the Roman Republic
2
Any one who knows Rome and its eighteen miles’ circuit of
walls, is well aware of the impossibility of defending it with a
small force against an army which, like that of the French in
1849, is superior in numbers and in every kind of munition of war.
It is therefore obvious that the whole force of the Roman army
ought not to have been employed in the defense of the capital,
but the greater part should have occupied the impregnable positions
with which the territory abounds, and the whole population
have been called to arms; while I should have been permitted to
continue my victorious march into the heart of the Neapolitan
kingdom; and, finally, after having sent out as many means of
defense as possible, the government itself should have left Rome,
and established itself in some central and defensible situation.
It is true that at the same time some measures ought to have
been taken to secure the public safety against the machinations
of the clerical element. This was not done, and the priests were
left, with an ill-judged toleration, to plot and intrigue, and, in the
end, contribute to the fall of the Republic and the misfortunes of
Italy.
Who knows what results might have followed the salutary
measures detailed above? Our fall — if we were destined to fall
in any case — would at least have taken place after we had done
our very utmost, and certainly not till after that of Hungary and
Venice.
On arriving at Rome . . . and seeing the way in which the
national cause was being managed, I claimed the dictatorship — as
sometimes during my previous life I had demanded and seized
the helm of a vessel which was being driven on the breakers.
Mazzini and his partisans were scandalized. However, a few
days after, on June 3, when the enemy, who had deluded them,
had made himself master of the positions commanding the city,
which we vainly attempted to retake at the cost of many precious
lives, — then, I say, the head of the Triumvirate1 wrote
to me, offering me the post of commander-in-chief. Being employed
in the post of honor, I thought it as well to thank him, and
go on with the bloody work of those ill-omened days. Oudinot,2
having received all the reinforcements he needed, thanks to the
negotiations with which he had lulled to sleep the suspicions of
the Republican government, prepared for action, announcing
that he would recommence hostilities on June 4, and the government
trusted to the word of the faithless soldier of
Bonaparte. . . .
Oudinot, who had given us warning for June 4, found it better
to take us by surprise in the night between the 2nd and 3rd. In
the early hours of the morning, we were awakened by the sound
of firing near Porta San Pancrazio. The alarm was sounded,
and the legionaries, though worn out with fatigue, were under
arms in a moment, and marching toward the spot where we heard
the fighting going on. Our men who garrisoned the posts outside
the walls had been surprised in a cowardly way, massacred or
made prisoners, and the enemy was already in possession of
Quattro Venti and other important points when, in all haste, we
reached Porta San Pancrazio. In the hope that it was not yet
occupied by a great number, I ordered an attack on the Casino
of Quattro Venti, feeling that on our possession of this point
depended the safety of Rome. It was attacked, I do not say
bravely, but heroically; first by the Italian legion, then by
Manara’s Bersaglieri, and lastly by several other corps in succession,
supported by the artillery from the walls, till night had
fallen. The enemy, knowing the importance of the position I
have mentioned, had occupied it with a strong body of their
best troops; and we vainly attempted to regain possession by
attacking it repeatedly with our bravest men. . . .
The 3rd of June decided the fate of Rome. The best officers
had been killed or wounded; the French remained masters of the
key to all the dominant positions, and, with their great strength
in numbers and artillery, had firmly established themselves there.
In the lateral positions carried by surprise and treachery they
began regular siege-works, as though they had to deal with a
fortress of the first order, which proves that they had met with
Italians who did fight.
I will pass over the siege-works, parallels, breaches, bombardment
with mortars, etc. All this, I think, has been related in
detail by many others; and I should not be able to do it with
great accuracy, being at the moment without the necessary data
and documents. What I can assert, however, is that from
April to July our raw levies fought creditably enough against a
veteran army, far superior in numbers, better organized, and possessed
of immense resources. At each position the ground was
disputed foot by foot, and there is not a single example of flight
before so formidable an enemy, or a battle in which they yielded
to force of numbers without Homeric fighting. . . .
The situation grew more difficult every day. Our brave
Manara found it less and less easy to find men for outpost and
line duty, indispensable as this was for the public safety. The
weakness of this part of the defense was certainly a potent cause
of the easy entrance effected by the mercenaries of Bonaparte
through the breaches their cannon had already made.
If Mazzini (and the blame rests on no one else) had had as
much practical capacity as fertility of imagination in planning
movements and enterprises, and if he had possessed — what he
always claimed to have — the genius for directing warlike
affairs; if, moreover, he had been willing to listen to some of his
friends, who, from their antecedents, might be supposed to know
something; — he would have made fewer mistakes, and, in the
crisis I am describing, might, if he could not have saved Italy,
at least have indefinitely retarded the Roman catastrophe;
and, I repeat, have left Rome the honor of having been the last
to fall, instead of succumbing sooner than Venice and Hungary.
I had sent Manara — the very day before his glorious death — to
Mazzini, with a message suggesting that we should leave
Rome, and march with all available men and supplies, of which
we possessed a considerable amount, to some stronghold in the
Apennines. To this day I do not know why it was not done.
History does not lack precedents . . . . It is not true that such a
measure was impossible, for when I left Rome a few days later,
with about four thousand men, I met with no obstacles. The
representatives of the people, mostly young and energetic patriots,
much beloved in their native districts, might have been
sent thither to kindle the enthusiasm of the populace, and so
tempt fortune once more.
Instead of this, it was said that defense was becoming impossible,
and the representatives remained at their posts — a
courageous resolve, honorable to them as individuals, but not
greatly tending to promote either the glory or the interest of
their country. Nor were they to be praised for adopting it,
while our resources were yet abundant, and Hungary and Venice
were still in arms against the enemies of Italy.
Meanwhile we were awaiting the entrance of the French, to
hand over to them the arms by whose means a painful and
shameful period of slavery was to be prolonged. I myself, having
a handful of comrades that I could count on, was resolved
not to surrender, but take to the country and try our fate
again.
Mr. Cass, the American ambassador, knowing how matters
stood, sent to me on July 3, saying he wished to speak with me.
I started for his house, but met him before reaching it; when he
told me, with great kindness, that an American corvette at
Civita Vecchia was at my disposal, if I wished to embark, with
any of my friends who might be compromised. I thanked the
generous representative of the great republic, but stated that I
intended to leave Rome with all who might be willing to follow
me, as I would not believe that my country’s cause was lost,
without striking one more blow to retrieve it. I then turned
towards Porta San Giovanni, where I was to meet my followers,
who had orders to prepare for leaving the city. On reaching
the square, I found most of them awaiting me; the rest were
gradually arriving. Many men belonging to other corps, who
had guessed or been informed of our project, also came to join us,
rather than submit to the degradation of laying down their arms
before the priest-ridden soldiers of Bonaparte.
1 , translated by A. Werner. 3 vols. London,
1889. Walter Smith and Innes.
2 Garibaldi, , vol. ii, pp. 13–21.
1 Mazzini.
2 The French commander. He was a son of Marshal Oudinot, famous in the
Napoleonic wars.