Argument for the Embargo (1808)

BY SENATOR WILLIAM BRANCH GILES

MR. PRESIDENT, I have always understood that there were two objects contemplated by the embargo laws—The first, precautionary, operating upon ourselves—The second, coercive, operating upon the aggressing belligerents. Precautionary, in saving our seamen, our ships and our merchandize from the plunder of our enemies, and avoiding the calamities of war. Coercive, by addressing strong appeals to the interests of both the belligerents. The first object has been answered beyond my most sanguine expectations. To make a fair and just estimate of this measure, reference should be had to our situation at the time of its adoption. At that time, the aggressions of both the belligerents were such, as to leave the United States but a painful alternative in the choice of one of three measures, to wit, the embargo, war, or submission. . . .

It was found that merchandize to the value of one hundred millions of dollars was actually afloat, in vessels amounting in value to twenty millions more—That all amount of merchandize and vessels equal to fifty millions more, was expected to be shortly put afloat, and that it would require fifty thousand seamen to be employed in the navigation of that enormous amount of property. The administration was informed of the hostile edicts of France previously issued, and then in a state of execution, and of an intention on the part of Great Britain to issue her orders, the character and object of which were also known. The object was, to sweep this valuable commerce from the ocean.— The situation of this commerce was as well known to Great Britain, as to ourselves, and her inordinate cupidity could not withstand the temptation of the rich booty, she vainly thought within her power. This was the state of information at the time this measure was recommended.

The President of the United States ever watchful and anxious for the preservation of the persons and property of all our fellow citizens, but particularly of the merchants, whose property is most exposed to danger, and of the seamen whose persons are also most exposed, recommended the embargo for the protection of both; and it has saved and protected both. . . . It is admitted by all, that the embargo laws have saved this enormous amount of property, and this number of seamen, which, without them, would have forcibly gone into the hands of our enemies, to pamper their arrogance, stimulate their injustice, and increase their means of annoyance.

I should suppose, Mr. President, this saving worth some notice. But, Sir, we are told that instead of protecting our seamen, it has driven them out of the country, and into foreign service. I believe, Sir, that this fact is greatly exaggerated. But, Sir, suppose for a moment that it is so, the government has done all, in this respect, it was bound to do. It placed these seamen in the bosoms of their friends and families, in a state of perfect security; and if they have since thought proper to abandon these blessings, and emigrate from their country, it was an act of choice, not of necessity. . . .

. . . But, Sir, these are not the only good effects of the embargo. It has preserved our peace—it has saved our honor—it has saved our national independence. Are these savings not worth notice? Are these blessings not worth preserving? . . .

The gentleman next triumphantly tells us that the embargo laws have not had their expected effects upon the aggressing belligerents. That they have not had their complete effects; that they have not caused a revocation of the British orders and French decrees, will readily be admitted; but they certainly have not been without beneficial effects upon those nations. . . .

The first effect of the embargo, upon the aggressing belligerents, was to lessen their inducements to war, by keeping out of their way, the rich spoils of our commerce, which had invited their cupidity, and which was saved by those laws. . . .

The second effect, which the embargo laws have had on the aggress-ing belligerents, is to enhance [the] prices of all American produce, especially articles of the first necessity to them, to a considerable degree, and, if it be a little longer persisted in, will either banish our produce, (which I believe indispensable to them,) from their markets altogether, or increase the prices to an enormous amount—and, of course, we may hope will furnish irresistible inducements for a relaxation of their hostile orders & edicts. . . .

All these considerations must present strong inducements to Great Britain to revoke her hostile orders; but she has hitherto refused to do so.

Let a candid inquiry be now made into the actual causes of this refusal. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd) informs us, that the British cabinet shewed some solicitude about the embargo laws, tilt some time between the 22d of June and the 29th of July last, within which time, information flowed in upon them, which relieved them from this solicitude . . .

What was the information that flowed in upon the British cabinet, from the 22d June to the 29th July? That period announced two events. First, the wonderful revolution in Spain; although this event must have been pretty well understood in London before even the 22d June, perhaps not to its full extent. The other event was, the paltry attempt at the resistance of the embargo laws in Vermont, magnified into a formidable insurrection against the government; and the unhappy discontents manifested in Boston and its neighborhood, together with the results of the elections in Massachusetts. All these circumstances were certainly greatly exaggerated, or perhaps, utterly misrepresented. Here, then sir, we clearly discern the real causes of the refusal of the British cabinet to meet the just and honorable proposition of the United States, and to revoke their orders in council. The Spanish revolution, no doubt, contributed to their determination; but the principal cause, was our [own] divisions and discontents, either wholly misrepresented or highly exaggerated. . . .

. . . The refusal of the British government, to revoke their hostile orders, therefore, appears not to have been founded upon a calculation of its interests upon correct information; but upon a miscalculation of its interests upon misinformation. . . .

It is asked, Sir, how do the embargo laws operate on France? It is readily admitted, that the commercial connection between the United States and France, is not of such a nature as to make a suspension of it operate as injuriously to France herself particularly in the interior, as on G. Britain. But our commerce cannot be deemed unimportant to France in the feeble state of her navy. . . .

The French West India islands too, have felt the pressure with great severity. . . .

I think . . . Sir, I am warranted in concluding, that if the embargo laws have failed of complete success, their failure has been owing to extraordinary causes which could neither have been foreseen nor anticipated at the time of the adoption of the measure, and therefore cannot furnish any imputation against its policy or wisdom.

. . . I have said, Sir, that there are no substitutes for the embargo, but war or submission. I will now proceed to prove this position—a repeal of the embargo without a substitute, is submission, if with a substitute, it is war. Gentlemen in the opposition, seem fully sensible of the delicacy and urgency of this part of the question. When pressed for their substitute, they manifest vast reluctance in producing it. . . .

. . . the gentleman from Connecticut . . . intimates merely that he is in favor of an armed commerce. . . .

. . . Would he extend it to acts of reprisal? If so, it is immediate war.—Would he stop short of that. It would still be war; but of a more inefficient kind. If our vessels are to arm, I presume their arms are to be used in self defence; they would be used against both the belligerents. In the present temper of Great-Britain, the first gun fired in a spirit of hostility, even with a blank cartridge; or if it were a popgun, would be instant war. It would be the signal to her navy to seize upon the whole of our commerce, which would be spread over the ocean, the moment of raising the embargo. The gentleman’s substitute I, therefore, believe to be war, and war of the most inefficient kind. A repeal of the embargo, without a substitute, is submission.—Submis-[s]ion to what! to colonization, to taxation, to tribute!!

[William B.] Giles. November 24, 1808 (Boston, [1808]), 4–15 passim.