Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989)

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.

No. 87-1346

Argued December 5, 1988
Decided February 21, 1989
498 U.S. 141

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Syllabus

Petitioner developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat that it marketed under the trade name Bonito Boat Model 5VBR. The manufacturing process involved creating a hardwood model that was then sprayed with fiberglass to create a mold. The mold then served to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. No patent application was filed to protect the utilitarian or design aspects of the hull or the manufacturing process by which the finished boats were produced. After the Bonito 5VBR had been on the market for six years, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute that prohibits the use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls, and forbids the knowing sale of hulls so duplicated. Petitioner subsequently filed an action in a Florida Circuit Court, alleging that respondent had violated the statute by using the direct molding process to duplicate the Bonito 5VBR fiberglass hull and by knowingly selling such duplicates. Petitioner sought damages, injunctive relief, and an award of attorney’s fees under the Florida law. The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statute conflicted with federal patent law, and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: The Florida statute is preempted by the Supremacy Clause. Pp. 146-168.

(a) This Court’s decisions have made clear that state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the federal patent statute’s balance between public right and private monopoly designed to promote certain creative activity. The efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234. A state law that interferes with the enjoyment of such a conception contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use that is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years. Pp. 146-157.

(b) By offering patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the federal patent scheme, the Florida statute conflicts with the "strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection." Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656. The Florida statute does not prohibit "unfair competition" in the usual sense of that term, but rather is aimed at promoting inventive effort by preventing the efficient exploitation of the design and utilitarian conceptions embodied in the product itself. It endows the original boat manufacturer with rights against the world, similar in scope and operation to the rights accorded the federal patentee. This protection is made available for an unlimited number of years to all boat hulls and their component parts. Protection is available for subject matter for which patent protection has been denied or has expired, as well as for designs which have been freely revealed to the consuming public by their creators. In this case, the statute operates to allow petitioner to assert a substantial property right in a design idea which has already been available to the public for over six years. Pp. 157-160.

(c) That the Florida statute does not restrict all means of reproduction does not eliminate the conflict with the federal patent scheme. In essence, the statute grants the original manufacturer the right to prohibit a form of reverse engineering of a product in general circulation. This is one of the rights granted to the federal patent holder, but has never been part of state protection under the law of unfair competition or trade secrets. The study and recomposition of unpatented articles available to the public at large may lead to significant advances in technology and design. Moreover, the threat of reverse engineering of unpatented articles creates a significant spur to the achievement of the rigorous standards of patentability established by Congress. By substantially altering this competitive reality, the Florida statute and similar state laws may erect themselves as substantial competitors to the federal patent scheme. Such a result would contravene the congressional intent to create a uniform system for determining the boundaries of public and private right in utilitarian and design ideas. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, distinguished. Pp. 160-165.

(d) The Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Federal Constitution do not by their own force, or by negative implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt rules to promote intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions where Congress has left the field free of federal regulation. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546. Even as to design and utilitarian conceptions within the subject matter of the patent laws, the States may place limited regulations on the exploitation of unpatented ideas to prevent consumer confusion as to source or the tortious appropriation of trade secrets. Both the law of unfair competition and state trade secret law have coexisted harmoniously with federal patent protection for almost 200 years, and Congress has demonstrated its full awareness of the operation of state law in these areas without any indication of disapproval. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238. The same cannot be said of the Florida scheme at issue here, where Congress has explicitly considered the need for additional protections for industrial designs and declined to act. By according patent-like protection to the otherwise unprotected design and utilitarian aspects of products in general circulation, the Florida statute enters a field of regulation which the patent laws have reserved to Congress, and is therefore preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. Pp. 165-168.

515 So.2d 220, affirmed.

O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.