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Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972)
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General SummaryThis case is from a collection containing the full text of over 16,000 Supreme Court cases from 1793 to the present. The body of Supreme Court decisions are, effectively, the final interpretation of the Constitution. Only an amendment to the Constitution can permanently overturn an interpretation and this has happened only four times in American history.
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972)
Loper v. Beto No. 70-5388 Argued January 13, 1972 Decided March 22, 1972 405 U.S. 473
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
For the purpose of impeaching petitioner’s credibility, the prosecutor in petitioner’s 1947 rape trial was permitted to interrogate him about his previous criminal record. Petitioner admitted four felony convictions during the period 1931-1940. He was found guilty by the jury and was sentenced to a term of 50 years. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in Federal District Court alleging that the previous convictions were constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, because he had been denied the assistance of counsel. The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the
fact that there are possible infirmities in the evidence does not necessarily raise an issue of constitutional proportions which would require reversal.
Held: The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Pp. 480-485.
440 F.2d 934, vacated and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded that the use of convictions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, to impeach a defendant’s credibility deprives him of due process of law. Pp. 480-483.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concluded that, although the Court of Appeals erred, on remand, that court does not necessarily have to set petitioner’s conviction aside. There remain unresolved issues: whether petitioner was represented by counsel at his earlier trials, and, if not, whether he waived counsel; and the possibility of a finding of harmless error, all of which should be considered in the first instance by the lower court. P. 485.
STEWART, J., announced the Court’s judgment and delivered an opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 485. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL, J., joined,post, p. 485. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 494. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 497.
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Chicago: U.S. Supreme Court, "Syllabus," Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) in 405 U.S. 473 405 U.S. 474. Original Sources, accessed November 24, 2024, http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=FM9UD8KJTV4UHXX.
MLA: U.S. Supreme Court. "Syllabus." Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972), in 405 U.S. 473, page 405 U.S. 474. Original Sources. 24 Nov. 2024. http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=FM9UD8KJTV4UHXX.
Harvard: U.S. Supreme Court, 'Syllabus' in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). cited in 1972, 405 U.S. 473, pp.405 U.S. 474. Original Sources, retrieved 24 November 2024, from http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=FM9UD8KJTV4UHXX.
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