United States v. Nix, 189 U.S. 199 (1903)

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United States v. Nix


Nos. 142

, 195


Submitted December 18, 1902
Decided March 2, 1903
189 U.S. 199

APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS

Syllabus

1. Under sec. 829, Rev.Stat., a United States marshal may elect to be reimbursed his actual traveling expenses incurred in serving writs, but there is no authority in law for allowing him mileage in excess of the distance from the place of arrest to the place of receiving the writs, even if the travel is in a new and unsettled Indian country and there are exceptional difficulties to overcome.

2. Where a United States court is opened for business by order of the judge, it is the duty of the marshal to attend, and he is entitled to his per diem fee therefor whether the judge be present or not.

3. A general act is not to be construed as applying to cases covered by a prior special act on the same subject. The marshal for the District of Oklahoma is entitled to fees for transportation of prisoners arrested under warrants issued by United States commissioners as fixed by the statute providing a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma, notwithstanding the provisions of the Act of Congress of August 19, 1894, applicable to marshals generally throughout the country. The fact that a marshal’s accounts have been approved by a district judge is sufficient to cast upon the government the burden of showing any error of fact in his account.

4. Where the marshal charged for travel in transporting a prisoner who escaped from his custody, and there was no finding, either by the district judge in approving his accounts or by the Court of Claims, of due diligence on the part of the officer to prevent the escape, the item was held to be properly disallowed, the presumption being that the prisoner escaped by negligence.

This is a petition for marshal’s fees for the District of Oklahoma, upon which the Court of Claims made the findings of fact set forth in the margin.*