Defence of the Jay Treaty (1796)

BY REPRESENTATIVE FISHER AMES

SHALL WE BREAK THE TREATY?

THE Treaty is bad, fatally bad, is the cry. It sacrifices the interest, the honor, the independence of the United States, and the faith of our engagements to France. . . . The language of passion and exaggeration may silence that of sober reason in other places, it has not done it here. The question here is, whether the treaty be really so very fatal as to oblige the nation to break its faith. . . .

IT is in vain to alledge that our faith plighted to France is violated by this new Treaty. Our prior Treaties are expressly saved from the operation of the British Treaty. And what do those mean, who say, that our honor was forfeited by treating at all, and especially by such a Treaty? Justice, the laws and practice of nations, a just regard for peace as a duty to mankind, and the known wish of our citizens, as well as that selfrespect which required it of the nation to act with dignity and moderation, all these forbid an appeal to arms before we had tried the effect of negociation. The honor of the United States was saved, not forfeited by treating. The Treaty itself by its stipulations for the posts, for indemnity and for a due observation of our neutral rights, has justly raised the character of the nation. Never did the name of America appear in Europe with more lustre than upon the event of ratifying this instrument. The fact is of a nature to overcome all contradiction.

BUT the independence of the country — we are colonists again. This is the cry of the very men who tell us that France will resent our exercise of the rights of an independent nation to adjust our wrongs with an aggressor, without giving her the opportunity to say those wrongs shall subsist and shall not be adjusted. This is an admirable specimen of independenee. The Treaty with Great Britain, it cannot be denied is unfavorable to this strange sort of independence. . . .

WHY do they complain that the West-Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the

East-Indies? Why do they pretend that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit — more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a Treaty of amity with Britain still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our Envoy, that he was not ardent enough in his hatred of Great-Britain? A Treaty of Amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman at the same instant repeats a very prevailing objection, that no Treaty should be made with the enemy of France. No Treaty, exclaim others, should be made with a monarch or a despot. There will be no naval security while those sea robbers domineer on the ocean. Their den must be destroyed. That nation must be extirpated. . . .

. . . Our claim to some agency in giving force and obligation to Treaties, is beyond all kind of controversy NOVEL. The sense of the nation is probably against it. The sense of the Government certainly is. The President denies it on constitutional grounds, and therefore cannot ever accede to our interpretation. The Senate ratified the Treaty and cannot without dishonour adopt it . . .

. . . If they refuse to concur, a Treaty once made remains of full force, although a breach on the part of the foreign nation would confer upon our own a right to forbear the execution. I repeat it, even in that case the act of this house cannot be admitted as the act of the nation, and if the President and Senate should not concur, the Treaty would be obligatory. . . .

ON every hypothesis therefore, the conclusion is not to be resisted, we are either to execute this treaty, or break our faith.

To expatiate on the value of public faith may pass with some men for declamation — to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge, can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement? . . .

IT is painful, I hope it is superfluous, to make even the supposition that America should furnish the occasion of this opprobrium. No, let me not even imagine that a republican government sprung, as our own is, from a people enlightened and uncorrupted, a government whose orig[i]n is right, and whose daily discipline is duty, can, upon solemn debate, make its option to be faithless — can dare to act what despots dare not avow, what our own example evinces the states of Barbary are unsuspected of. No, let me rather make the supposition that Great Britain refuses to execute the treaty, after we have done every thing to carry it into effect. Is there any language of reproach pungent enough to express your commentary on the fact? What would you say, or rather what would you not say? Would you not tell them, wherever an Englishman might travel shame would stick to him — he would disown his country. You would exclaim, Eugland, proud of your wealth, and arrogant in the possession of power — blush for these distinctions, which become the vehicles of your dishonor. Such a nation might truly say, to corruption, Thou art my father, and to the worm, Thou art my mother and my sister. We should say of such a race of men, their name is a heavier burden than their debt.

I CAN scarcely persuade myself to believe that the consideration I have suggested requires the aid of any auxiliary. But, unfortunately, auxiliary arguments are at hand. Five millions of dollars, and probably more, on the score of spoliations committed on our commerce, depend upon the treaty. — The treaty offers the only prospect of indemnity. Such redress is promised as the merchants place some confidence in. Will you interpose and frustrate that hope? Leaving to many families nothing but beggary and despair. . . .

THE refusal of the posts (inevitable if we reject the treaty) is a measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences. From great causes we are to took for great effects. A plain and obvious one will be, the price of the western lands will fall. gettlers will not chuse to fix their habitation on a field of battle. Those who talk so much of the interest of the United States should calculate how deeply it will be affected by rejecting the treaty — how vast a tract of wild land will almost cease to be property. This loss, let it be observed, will fall upon a fund expressly devoted to sink the national debt. . . .

WILL the tendency to Indian hostilities be contested by any one? Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war until the negociation with Great-Britain was far advanced, and then the state of hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they are not. We ought not however to expect that neighbouring nations, highly irritated against each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages, the traders will gain an influence and will abuse it — and who is ignorant that their passions are easily raised and hardly restrained from violence? Their situation will oblige them to chuse between this country and Great-Britain, in case the Treaty should be rejected. They will not be our friends and at the same time the friends of our enemies. . . .

IT is not the part of prudence to be inattentive to the tendencies of measures. Where there is any ground to fear that these will be pernicious, wisdom and duty forbid that we should underate them. — If we reject the treaty, will our peace be as safe as if we execute it with good faith? . . .

ARE the Posts to remain forever in the possession of Great-Britain? Let those who reject them, when the Treaty offers them to our hands, say, if they chuse, they are of no importance. If they are, will they take them by force? The argument I am urging would then come to a point. To use force is war. To talk of Treaty again is too absurd. Posts and redress must come from voluntary good will, Treaty of war.

The conclusion is plain, if the state of peace shall continue, so will the British possession of the posts.

Look again at this state of things: On the sea coast, vast losses uncompensated; on the frontier, Indian war, actual encroachment on our territory. Every where discontent, resentments tenfold more fierce because they will be impotent and humbled. National discord and abasement.

THE disputes of the old treaty of 1783, being left to rankle, will revive the almost extinguished animosities of that period. Wars in all countries, and most of all in such as are free, arise from the impetuosity of the public feelings. . . . War might perhaps be delayed, but could not be prevented. The causes of it would remain, would be aggravated, would be multiplied, and soon become intolerable. More captures, more impressments would swell the list of our wrongs, and the current of our rage. . . .

WILL our government be able to temper and restrain the turbulence of such a crisis? The government, alas, will be in no capacity to govern. A divided people, and divided councils! Shall we cherish the spirit of peace, or shew the energies of war? Shall we make our adversary afraid of our strength, or dispose him, by the measures of resentment and broken faith, to respect our rights? Do gentlemen rely on the state of peace because both nations will be worse disposed to keep it? Because injuries, and insults still harder to endure, will be mutually offered.

SUCH a state of things will exist, if we should long avoid war, as will be worse than war. Peace without security, accumulation of injury without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, contempt for ourselves, intestine discord, and anarchy. . . . Is this the station of American dignity which the highspirited champions of our national independence and honor could endure — nay, which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for the country? What is there in the treaty that could humble us so low? Are they the men to swallow their resentments, who so lately were choaking with them? If in the case contemplated by them, it should be peace, I do not hesitate to declare it ought not to be peace. . . .

LET me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready to despond on this prospect, by presenting another which it is yet in our power to realise. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country without some desire for its continuance, without some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess have preserved it? . . . The great interest and the general desire of our people was to enjoy the advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented, affords America that inestimable security. The causes of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negociation, after the end of the European war. This was gaining every thing, because it confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are gaining every thing. This alone would justify the engagements of the government. For, when the fiery vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentered in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm. This treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded at the same time the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it, the vivid colours will grow pale, it will be a baleful meteor portending tempest and war.

[Fisher] Ames, April 28, 1796 (Boston, [1796]), 17–50 passim.