Outbreak of War (1898)

FROM THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK

BOTH Congress and the people had sunk the question of the Maine in the larger one of Cuban independence. Destitution among the reconcentrados was constantly growing worse, thousands dying slowly from starvation. American supplies were distributed to the sufferers through Miss Clara Barton, President of the Red Cross Society, and General Fitzhugh Lee, our Consul at Havana. . . .

On March 31 Captain-General Blanco issued a decree putting an end to reconcentration in the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, and on April 9 the Spanish Cabinet decided to grant an armistice to the insurgents, while both the Pope and the great Powers of Europe were using their influence to avert a Spanish-American war. Nevertheless the replies at this time of the Madrid government to President McKinley’s demands concerning the pacification of Cuba, notwithstanding the Spanish offer to arbitrate the Maine trouble, led the authorities at Washington to believe that pacification could not be attained without the armed intervention of the United States. The President’s message to Congress, which was daily expected, was withheld . . . until April 11. . . . Both Congress and the people had grown impatient waiting for the message, and when it finally came excitement was at such a height that many condemned it for its conservatism. It was, however, a wise and ably conceived document. The President stated the entire issue, rightly considering the Maine disaster a subordinate matter, and passed in review Spanish mismanagement and outrage in Cuba, and the repeated promises and the repeated failures of the Spanish government to effect suitable reforms. . . .

The conclusion of the long message and the really important part was as follows:

"The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and act, the war in Cuba must stop.

"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress gress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens, as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.". . .

. . . The resolutions . . . were accepted by both Houses in the small hours of the morning of April 19,—by the Senate, by a vote of 42 to 35, and by the House by a vote of 310 to 6,—and were signed by the President on the following day. . . . The following is the text of the act . . .

". . . be it resolved:

"First—That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second—That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third—That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into active service the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth—That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

On the 20th of April the President signed his ultimatum to the Spanish government, a copy of which was handed to Minister Polo, who immediately demanded his passports and started for Canada, leaving the interests of the Spanish legation in charge of M. Cambon, the French Minister. Before receiving the ultimatum the Spanish Cabinet delivered to Minister Woodford his passports and informed him that diplomatic relations with the United States were at an end. On the 25th a bill was passed by Congress declaring that a state of war existed between the United States and Spain, and had so existed since and including April 21.

In the meantime war preparations were being pushed forward by both governments. The Queen-Regent signed a decree asking for a national subscription to the navy, our own navy was increased lay the purchase of many more ships of various kinds, and by the middle of the month the troops throughout the country were preparing to move towards the Gulf. On the 17th two companies of the Twenty-fifth Infantry reached Key West and two days later a general movement of regular troops began. The principal rendezvous was Chickamauga, but New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa were also places of mobilization. The President issued a call for 125,000 volunteers on April 23, which though meeting with immediate response received not a little adverse criticism, the dissatisfaction arising from the fact that in some States the infantry and artillery requisitions were not consistently apportioned, and from the fact that the Department of War proposed to use its privilege, if it chose, of destroying the integrity of State organizations when the troops were beyond State boundaries. A few days later orders were issued for recruiting the regular army up to its war strength, 61,000. On the 21st the fleet under acting Rear-Admiral Sampson at Key West was ordered to proceed to Havana and then institute a general blockade of the western end of Cuba. Commodore Schley with the "flying squadron" was detained at Hampton Roads in order to meet any attack which might be made on the coast cities by the Spanish Cape Verde fleet, reports from which for a number of weeks subsequent were contradictory and alarming.

During the rest of the month many prizes were taken in western Cuban waters. It was not the purpose of Admiral Sampson to bombard Havana or expose his fleet to the enemy’s fire from coast fortifications before he was assured of the destination of the Spanish Cape Verde and Cadiz fleets; but at the same time he determined to prevent the erection of any new fortifications. This brought about the first action of the war, the bombardment of the works . . . at Matanzas, April 27. . . .

, 1898 (edited by Frank Moore Colby, New York [1899]), 727–729 passim.