Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274

No. 88-64

Argued February 21, 1989
Decided June 19, 1989
491 U.S. 274

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

In this major school desegregation litigation in Kansas City, Missouri, in which various desegregation remedies were granted against the State of Missouri and other defendants, the plaintiff class was represented by a Kansas City lawyer (Benson) and by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF). Benson and the LDF requested attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988), which provides with respect to such litigation that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, "a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs." In calculating the hourly rates for Benson’s, his associates’, and the LDF attorneys’ fees, the District Court took account of delay in payment by using current market rates, rather than those applicable at the time the services were rendered. Both Benson and the LDF employed numerous paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates, and the court awarded fees for their work based on market rates, again using current, rather than historic rates, in order to compensate for the delay in payment.

Held:

1. The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award under § 1988 against a State to compensate for delay in payment. That Amendment has no application to an award of attorney’s fees, ancillary to a grant of prospective relief, against a State, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, and it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee. An adjustment for delay in payment is an appropriate factor in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee under § 1988. Pp. 278-284.

2. The District Court correctly compensated the work of paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates at the market rates for their services, rather than at their cost to the attorneys. Clearly, "a reasonable attorney’s fee," as used in § 1988, cannot have been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the Bar. Rather, that term must refer to a reasonable fee for an attorney’s work product, and thus must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but also the work of paralegals and the like. A reasonable attorney’s fee under § 1988 is one calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market and one that grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a "fully compensatory fee," comparable to what "is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client." In this case, where the practice in the relevant market is to bill the work of paralegals separately, the District Court’s decision to award separate compensation for paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates at prevailing market rates was fully in accord with § 1988. Pp. 284-289.

838 F.2d 260, affirmed.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which O’CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined in part, post, p. 289. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 295. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.