CHAPTER XVIII—NEUTRAL TRADE

Experience of Impressments (1804)

BY CAPTAIN BASIL HALL (1831)

THERE was another circumstance connected with our proceedings at that time, of still more serious annoyance to the Americans, and one requiring, in its discussion, still greater delicacy of handling. I shall not, indeed, presume to enter upon its very difficult merits, but, as before, content myself with merely describing the circumstances. I need hardly mention that I allude to the impressment of those seamen whom we found serving on board American merchant ships, but who were known to be, or supposed to be, British subjects. What the strict letter of the law is now, I am not aware—I mean, what would be considered the ’law of usage’ in the event of another war. But I presume we should act pretty much as we did before, and consequently incur the risk, whatever that might be, of converting a neutral into an enemy, rather than agree to relinquish our right to command the services of any British-born subject, whenever we found him on the high seas. At all events, it seems quite clear that, while we can hold it, we will never give up the right of search, or the right of impressment. We may and ought, certainly, to exercise so disagreeable a power with such temper and discretion as not to provoke the enmity of any friendly nation.

But at the time I speak of, and on board our good old ship the Leander, whose name, I was grieved, but not surprised, to find, was still held in detestation three or four and twenty years afterwards at New York, I am sorry to own that we had not much of this discretion in our proceedings; or, rather, we had not enough consideration for the feelings of the people we were dealing with. We have since learnt to respect them more—or, as they prefer to express it, they have since taught us to respect them: be it either way, it matters not much; and if it please the Americans more to say they have instructed us in this point of good manners, than to allow that we have come to a knowledge of better habits, well and good. I am grievously afraid, however, that if we come again to be placed in like circumstances, and our ships of war are in want of men, whilst Englishmen are to be found in numbers on board American ships, we shall always fall upon some good excuse for impressing His Majesty’s liege subjects, find them where we may. However civilly we may then set about this duty — as a duty it certainly will appear—the old charges, I fear, will again be raised up against us.

To place the full annoyance of these matters in a light to be viewed fairly by English people, let us suppose that the Americans and French were to go to war, and that England for once remained neutral—an odd case, I admit, but one which might happen. Next, suppose that a couple of French frigates were chased into Liverpool, and that an American squadron stationed itself off that harbour to watch the motions of these French ships, which had claimed the protection of our neutrality, and were accordingly received into ’our waters,’—I ask, "would this blockade of Liverpool be agreeable to us, or not?"

Even if the blockading American frigates did nothing but sail backwards and forwards across the harbour’s mouth, or occasionally run up and anchor abreast of the town, it would not, ’I guess,’ be very pleasant to be thus superintended. If, however, the American ships, in addition to this legitimate surveillance of their enemy, were to detain off the port, with equal legitimacy of usage, and within a league or so of the light-house, every British ship coming from France, or from a French colony; and if, besides looking over the papers of these ships, to see whether all was regular, they were to open every private letter, in the hope of detecting some trace of French ownership in the cargo, what should we say? And if, out of some twenty ships arrested daily in this manner, one or two of our ships were to be completely diverted from their course, from time to time, and sent off under a prize-master to New York for adjudication, I wonder, how the Liverpool folks would like it? But if, in addition to this perfectly regular and usual exercise of a belligerent right on the part of the Americans, under such circumstances, we bring in that most awkward and ticklish of questions, the impressment of seamen, let us consider how much the feeling of annoyance, on the part of the English neutral, would be augmented.

Conceive, for instance, that the American squadron, employed to blockade the French ships in Liverpool, were short handed, but, from being in daily expectation of bringing their enemy to action, it had become an object of great consequence with them to get their ships manned. And suppose, likewise, that it were perfectly notorious to all parties, that, on board every English ship arriving or sailing from the port in question, there were several American citizens, but calling themselves English, and having in their possession ’protections,’ or certificates to that effect, sworn to in regular form, but well known to be false, and such as might be bought for 4s. 6d. any day. Things being in this situation, if the American men-of-war, off the English port, were then to fire at and stop every ship, and, besides overhauling her papers and cargo, were to take out any seaman, to work their own guns withal, whom they had reason, or supposed, or said they had reason, to consider American citizens, or whose country they guessed from dialect, or appearance; I wish to know with what degree of patience this would be submitted to on the Exchange at Liverpool, or elsewhere in England?

It signifies nothing to say that such a case could not occur, as the Americans do not impress seamen; for all who have attended to such subjects know well enough, that if they come to be engaged in a protracted war, especially at a distance from their own shores, there is no other possible way by which they can keep their armed ships manned. This, however, is not the point now in discussion. I merely wish to put the general case broadly before our own eyes, in order that we may bring it distinctly home to ourselves, and then see whether or not the Americans had reason for their indignation.

The truth is, they had very good reason to be annoyed; and if the guiding practical maxim amongst nations be, that ’might makes right,’ as I conceive it always has been, and ever will be, so long as powder and shot exist, with money to back them, and energy to wield them,—then we really cannot pretend to find fault with the Americans, because they took advantage, or tried to take advantage, of that moment when, our ’right’ being the same, our ’might’ appeared to be waning. I allude to their declaring war against us in 1812, when we, fighting single-handed, in the cause of European independence, were so hard pressed by Napoleon and others. For the Americans to have taken an earlier share in the struggle against us, when we were lords of the ascendant, would have been the extremity of Quixotism. But when John Bull was pressed on all hands by numbers, and his strength exhausted by long contests, albeit in the cause of liberty, which his brother Jonathan professes to adore, he, Jonathan, would have been a fool, a character which he certainly never was accused of enacting, if he had not taken advantage of the moment to try his strength. The provocation we gave was certainly considerable, and the retort, it must be owned, very dexterously managed. The result, I trust, is, that things are on a better footing than before; both parties have learned civility and caution, and they will not agree the worse on that account. To forgive and forget, is the old English maxim, as our friends well know. Let them imitate us in this respect, and they will be all the happier, and not a whit tess powerful.

In putting a parallel case to ours off New York, and supposing Liverpool to be blockaded by the Americans on the ground of their watching some French ships, I omitted to throw in one item, which is necessary to complete the parallel, and make it fit the one from which it is drawn.

Suppose the blockading American ships off Liverpool, in firing a shot ahead of a vessel they wished to examine, had accidentally hit, not that vessel, but a small coaster, so far beyond her, that she was not even noticed by the blockading ships. And suppose, further, this unlucky chance-shot to have killed one of the crew on board the said coaster: the vessel would, of course, proceed immediately to Liverpool with the body of their slaughtered countryman; and, in fairness, it may be asked, what would have been the effect of such a spectacle on the population of England—more particularly if such an event had occurred at the moment of a general election, when party politics, raging on this very question of foreign interference, was at its height?

This is not an imaginary case; for it actually occurred in 1804, when we were blockading the French frigates in New York. A casual shot from the Leander hit an unfortunate sloop’s main-boom; and the broken spar striking the mate, John Pierce by name, killed him instantly. The sloop sailed on to New York, where the mangled body, raised on a platform, was paraded through the streets, in order to augment the vehement indignation, already at a high pitch, against the English.

Now, let us be candid to our rivals; and ask ourselves, whether the Americans would have been worthy of our friendship, or even of our hostility, had they tamely submitted to indignities which, if passed upon ourselves, would have roused not only Liverpool, but the whole country, into a towering passion of nationality?

Captain Basil Hall, [First Series] (Edinburgh, etc., 1831), I, 292–301.