Fragments of Thought of Melissos

Melissos

1. If nothing is, what can be said of it as of something real? R.P. 110.

2. What was was ever, and ever shall be. For, if it had come into being, there needs must have been nothing before it came into being. Now, if nothing were to exist, in no wise could anything have arisen out of nothing. R.P. 110a.

7. Since, then, it has not come into being, and since it is, it was ever and ever shall be, and has no beginning or end, but is infinite. For, if it had come into being, it would have had a beginning (or it would have begun to come into being at some time or other) and an end (for it would have ceased to come into being at some time or other); but, if it neither began nor ended, it ever was and ever shall be, and has no beginning or end; for it is not possible for anything to be ever without being all. R.P. 111a, fin.

8. Further, just as it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in magnitude (for if it had bounds, it would be bounded by empty space). R. P. 111a, init.

9. But nothing which has a beginning or end is either eternal or infinite.

10. For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it could not be infinite; for then it would be bounded by another. R. P. 112a.

10a. (And, since it is one, it is alike throughout; for if it were unlike, it would be many and not one.)

11. So then it is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it cannot perish nor become greater, nor does it suffer pain or grief. For, if any of these things happened to it, it would no longer be one. For if it is altered, then the real must needs not be all alike, but what was before must pass away, and what was not must come into being. Now, if the all had changed by so much as a single hair, in thirty thousand years, it would all perish in the whole of time. R.P. 113a.

12. Further, it is not possible either that its order should be changed; for the order which it had before does not perish, nor does that which was not come into being. But, since nothing is either added to it or passes away or is altered, how can any real thing have had its order changed? For if anything became different, that would amount to a change in its order. R.P. ib.

13. Nor does it suffer pain; for the All cannot be in pain. For a thing in pain could not be ever, nor could it have the same power as what is whole. It is only from the addition or subtraction of something that it could feel pain, and then it would no longer be like itself. Nor could what is whole possibly begin to feel pain; for then what was whole and what was real would pass away, and what was not would come into being. And the same argument applies to grief as to pain. R. P. ib.

14. Nor is anything empty. For what is empty is nothing.…What is nothing, then, cannot be.

Nor does it move; for it has nowhere to betake itself to, but is full. For if there were empty space, it would betake itself to empty space. But, since there is no empty space, it has no place to betake itself to.

And it cannot be dense and rare; for it is not possible for what is rarefied to be as full as what is dense, but what is rare is ipso facto emptier than what is dense.

This is the way in which we must distinguish between what is full and what is not full. If a thing has room for anything else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it has no room for anything and does not take it in, it is full.

Now, it must needs be full if there is no empty space, and if it is full, it does not move (n. 45).

15. If what is real is divided, it moves; but if it moves, it cannot have body; for, if it had body it would have parts, and would no longer be one. R.P. 114.

17. This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; but the following are proofs of it also. If it were a many, these would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if there is earth and water, and air and iron, and gold and fire, and if one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and white and all that men say they really are,—if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we at first concluded that reality was, and they cannot be changed or altered. Whereas we say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what is warm becomes cold, and what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all those things are changed. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away with the finger, passing away in rust; and so with gold and stone and everything which we fancy to be strong, so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. Earth, too, and stone are formed out of water. Now these things do not agree with one another. We said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and strength of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer alteration, and that they change with each perception. It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what was has passed away, and what was not is come into being. So then, if there were many things, they would have to be just of the same nature as the one. R.P. 115.

Translations of John Burnet.