United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
No. 98
Argued November 19, 20, 1936
Decided December 21, 1936
299 U.S. 304
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Syllabus
1. A Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, provided:
That if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those countries, and if, after consultation with the governments of other American Republics and with their cooperation, as well as that of such other governments as he may deem necessary, he makes proclamation to that effect, it shall be unlawful to sell, except under such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war in any place in the United States to the countries now engaged in that armed conflict, or to any person, company, or association acting in the interest of either country, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.
Violation was made punishable as a crime. The President issued two proclamations, one on the date of the Resolution, putting it into operation, the other on November 14, 1935, revoking the first proclamation.
Held:
(1) The Joint Resolution is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Executive. Pp. 314, 329.
(2) The powers of the Federal Government over foreign or external affairs differ in nature and origin from those over domestic or internal affairs. P. 315.
(3) The broad statement that the Federal Government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the States such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the Federal Government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the States. Id.
(4) The States severally never possessed international powers. P. 316.
(5) As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the Colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the Colonies severally, but to the Colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America. Id.
(6) The Constitution was ordained and established, among other things, to form "a more perfect Union." Prior to that event, the Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be "perpetual," was the sole possessor of external sovereignty, and in the Union it remained without change save insofar as the Constitution, in express terms, qualified its exercise. Though the States were several, their people, in respect of foreign affairs, were one. P. 317.
(7) The investment of the Federal Government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. P. 318.
(8) In the international field, the sovereignty of the United States is complete. Id.
(9) In international relations, the President is the sole organ of the Federal Government. P. 319.
(10) In view of the delicacy of foreign relations and of the power peculiar to the President in this regard, Congressional legislation which is to be made effective in the international field must often accord to him a degree of discretion and freedom which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. P. 319.
(11) The marked difference between foreign and domestic affairs in this respect is recognized in the dealings of the houses of Congress with executive departments. P. 321.
(12) Unbroken legislative practice from the inception almost of the national government supports the conclusion that the Joint Resolution, supra, is not an unconstitutional delegation of power. P. 322.
(13) Findings of jurisdictional facts in the first proclamation, following the language of the Joint Resolution, were sufficient. P. 330.
(14) The revocation of the first proclamation by the second did not have the effect of abrogating the Resolution or of precluding its enforcement by prosecution and punishment of offenses committed during the life of the first proclamation. P. 331.
2. Upon an appeal by the United States under the Criminal Appeals Act from a decision holding an indictment bad on demurrer, this Court has jurisdiction of questions involving the validity of the statute on which the indictment was founded which were decided by the District Court in favor of the United States. P. 329.
14 F.Supp. 230, reversed.
APPEAL, under the Criminal Appeals Act, from a judgment quashing an indictment for conspiracy.