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Fragments of Thought of Leukippos and Demokritos
Fragments of Thought of Leukippos and Demokritos
Leukippos and Demokritos have decided about all things practically by the same method and on the same theory, taking as their starting-point what naturally comes first. Some of the ancients had held that the real must necessarily be one and immovable; for, said they, empty space is not real, and motion would be impossible without empty space separated from matter; nor, further, could reality be a many, if there were nothing to separate things. And it makes no difference if any one holds that the All is not continuous, but discrete, with its parts in contact (Pythagorean view), instead of holding that reality is many, not one, and that there is empty space. For, if it is divisible at every point there is no one, and therefore no many, and the Whole is empty (Zeno); while, if we say it is divisible in one place and not in another, this looks like an arbitrary fiction; for up to what point and for what reason will part of the Whole be in this state and be full, while the rest is discrete? And, on the same grounds, they further say that there can be no motion. In consequence of these reasonings, then, going beyond perception and overlooking it in the belief that we ought to follow the argument, they say that the All is one and immovable, and some of them that it is infinite (Melissos), for any limit would be bounded by empty space. This, then, is the opinion they expressed about the truth, and these are the reasons which led them to do so. Now, so far as arguments go, this conclusion does seem to follow; but, if we appeal to facts, to hold such a view looks like madness. No one who is mad is so far out of his senses that fire and ice appear to him to be one; it is only things that are right, and things that appear right from habit, in which madness makes some people see no difference.
Leukippos, however, thought he had a theory which was in harmony with sense-perception, and did not do away with coming into being and passing away, nor motion, nor the multiplicity of things. He made this concession to experience, while he conceded, on the other hand, to those who invented the One that motion was impossible without the void, that the void was not real, and that nothing of what was real was not real. "For," said he, "that which is, strictly speaking, real is an absolute plenum: but the plenum is not one. On the contrary, there are an infinite number of them, and they are invisible owing to the smallness of their bulk. They move in the void (for there is a void); and by their coming together they effect coming into being; by their separation, passing away."
He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and rush together. They come into collision, and those which are of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise.
Translations of John Burnet.
Chicago: Fragments of Thought of Leukippos and Demokritos in The Library of Original Sources, ed. Oliver J. Thatcher (Milwaukee, WI: University Research Extension Co., 1907), 188–189. Original Sources, accessed November 21, 2024, http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=B12Z1VNKJGJNCCV.
MLA: . Fragments of Thought of Leukippos and Demokritos, in The Library of Original Sources, edited by Oliver J. Thatcher, Vol. 2, Milwaukee, WI, University Research Extension Co., 1907, pp. 188–189. Original Sources. 21 Nov. 2024. http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=B12Z1VNKJGJNCCV.
Harvard: , Fragments of Thought of Leukippos and Demokritos. cited in 1907, The Library of Original Sources, ed. , University Research Extension Co., Milwaukee, WI, pp.188–189. Original Sources, retrieved 21 November 2024, from http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=B12Z1VNKJGJNCCV.
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