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Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996)
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General SummaryThis case is from a collection containing the full text of over 16,000 Supreme Court cases from 1793 to the present. The body of Supreme Court decisions are, effectively, the final interpretation of the Constitution. Only an amendment to the Constitution can permanently overturn an interpretation and this has happened only four times in American history.
Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996)
Leavitt v. Jane L. No. 95-1242 Decided June 17, 1996 518 U.S. 137
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Utah law permits abortions under only five enumerated circumstances with respect to pregnancies of 20 weeks or less, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-302(2), and under only three of those circumstances with respect to pregnancies of more than 20 weeks, § 76-7302(3). The law also provides that the legislature "would have passed [every aspect of the law] irrespective of the fact that any one or more provision . . . be declared unconstitutional." § 76-7-317. The Federal District Court held § 302(2) unconstitutional, but found § 302(3) to be both constituional and severable. However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 302(3) was not severable, reasoning that the Utah Legislature would not have wanted to regulate later-term abortions unless it could regulat earlier-term ones.
Held: the Tenth Circuit’s severability decision is flatly contradicted by § 76-7-317, and, thus, is unsustainable. Contrary to that court’s conslusion, Utah law does not require the subordination of severability clauses to the legislature’s overarching substantive intentions. Utah cases support the proporition that, where a statute’s provisions are interrelated, a court may not select the Act’s valid portions and conjecture that they should stand independently of invalid portions. However, such concerns are absent here. There is no need to resort to conjecture, for § 317 could not be clearer in in its message that the legislature intended §§ 303(2) and (3) to be severable. In addition, the two subsections are not "interrelated" in any relevant sense -- i.e., in the sense of being so interdependent that the remainder of the statute cannot function effectively without the invalidated provision, or in the sense that the invalidated provision could be regarded as part of a legislative compromise extracted in exchange for the inclusion of other statutory provisions.
Certiorari granted; 61 F.2d 1493, reversed and remanded.
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Chicago: U.S. Supreme Court, "Syllabus," Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) in 518 U.S. 137 Original Sources, accessed November 22, 2024, http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=98UKSBASRZDAAEG.
MLA: U.S. Supreme Court. "Syllabus." Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996), in 518 U.S. 137, Original Sources. 22 Nov. 2024. http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=98UKSBASRZDAAEG.
Harvard: U.S. Supreme Court, 'Syllabus' in Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996). cited in 1996, 518 U.S. 137. Original Sources, retrieved 22 November 2024, from http://originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=98UKSBASRZDAAEG.
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