Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931)

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, dissenting.

Our jurisdiction over this case is limited by § 391, Title 28, U.S. Code, which provides:

All United States courts shall have power to grant new trials, in cases where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law. On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

The petitioner, a negro, killed a white policeman in the District of Columbia. He was indicted, tried, and found guilty by a jury. He moved for a new trial upon the ground, among others,

that this Court committed error in refusing to examine the jury on their voir dire as to whether any juror may entertain racial prejudice in a matter of homicide where the defendant is a negro and the deceased a white policeman.

This was overruled, and sentence of death followed.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District, the following error, among others, was assigned:

The court’s action in refusing the request of the defendant to propound to the jury during the court’s examination of the jury on its voir dire as to whether any juror may entertain racial prejudice in the matter of a homicide where the defendant is a negro and the deceased a white policeman.

Replying to this that court said:

Counsel for defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court to allow him to inquire of the prospective jurors on their voir dire whether they entertained racial prejudice in a case wherein the defendant is a negro and the deceased a white man. We had occasion to consider this same question in the case of Crawford v. United States, 59 App.D.C. 356, 41 F.2d 979. We have given the matter further careful consideration in this case, and find no reason to recede from our former decision. In a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, where the colored race is accorded all the privileges and rights under the law that are afforded the white race, and especially the right to practice in the courts, serve on the jury, etc., we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to permit the question to be answered by the jurors.

This Court granted a certiorari to bring up the judgment of affirmance, but limited review to the point raised by the quoted assignment of error.

It appears that, while the trial judge was examining prospective jurors on their voir dire, counsel for the accused said to him:

At the last trial of this case. I understand there was one woman on the jury who was a southerner, and who said that the fact that the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man perhaps somewhat influenced her. I don’t like to ask that question in public.

The precise nature of "that question" is unknown to us. The judge thought "that question" (whatever it was) improper, and refused to ask it. Whereupon counsel noted an exception and

requested the court to allow the record to show that the question relative to racial prejudice be propounded to each and every prospective juror, with the exception heretofore noted on behalf of the defendant.

Solely because of the refusal of the trial judge to propound an undisclosed question "relative to racial prejudice" (whatever that may be), we are asked to upset a judgment approved by the judges of both local courts who, it is fair to presume, understand conditions in the District better than we do.

Nothing is revealed by the record which tends to show that any juror entertained prejudice which might have impaired his ability fairly to pass upon the issues. It is not even argued that, considering the evidence presented, there was room for reasonable doubt of guilt.

It does appear that counsel said he understood at a former trial a female juror, a Southerner (whatever that may mean), declared "the fact the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man perhaps somewhat influenced her." And that is the sum of the information to be gathered from the record in respect of any "race prejudice" which might have so distorted some juror’s judgment as to prevent honest and fair consideration.

How this unidentified woman juror voted, whether she was white or black, whether her prepossessions were right or wrong or materially different from those generally entertained by men of one color towards those of another we cannot know. But "perhaps she was somewhat influenced" by the fact that the dead man and the defendant were of different color. Must we therefore decide that "perhaps" and accordingly some member of the second jury failed to act fairly, intelligently, and without due regard to his oath,

Two local courts could not conclude that there was adequate reason for holding the accused man had suffered deprivation of any substantial right through refusal by the trial judge to ask prospective jurors something relative to racial prejudice. And certainly I am unable to affirm that they were wrong.

Section 391 of the U.S.Code, I think, was intended to prevent escape of culprits from prompt deserved punishment in cases like this. Congress had clear right to put the limitation on courts of review and the enactment should be given effect according to its purpose.

Unhappily, the enforcement of our criminal laws is scandalously ineffective. Crimes of violence multiply; punishment walks lamely. Courts ought not to increase the difficulties by magnifying theoretical possibilities. It is their province to deal with matters actual and material; to promote order and not to hinder it by excessive theorizing of or by magnifying what in practice is not really important.

I think the judgment below should be affirmed.