Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes

No. 90-1859

Argued Jan. 15, 1992
Decided May 4, 1992
504 U.S. 1

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

In collateral state court proceedings, respondent, a Cuban immigrant with little education and almost no knowledge of English, alleged, inter alia, that his plea of nolo contendere to first-degree manslaughter had not been knowing and intelligent, and therefore was invalid because his court-appointed translator had not translated accurately and completely for him the mens rea element of the crime in question. The state court dismissed the petition after a hearing, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, the State Supreme Court denied review, and the Federal District Court denied respondent habeas corpus relief. However, the Court of Appeals held that he was entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on the question whether the mens rea element of the crime was properly explained to him, since the record disclosed that the material facts concerning the translation were not adequately developed at the state court hearing, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, and since postconviction counsel’s negligent failure to develop those facts did not constitute a deliberate bypass of the orderly procedure of the state courts, see id. at 317; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438.

Held: A "cause and prejudice" standard, rather than Fay’s deliberate bypass standard, is the correct standard for excusing a habeas petitioner’s failure to develop a material fact in state court proceedings. Townsend’s holding that the Fay standard is applicable in a case like this must be overruled in light of more recent decisions involving, like Fay, a state procedural default, in which this Court has rejected the deliberate bypass standard in favor of a standard of cause and prejudice. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88, and n. 12; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 751. It would be irrational to distinguish between failing to properly assert a federal claim in state court and failing in state court to properly develop such a claim, and to apply to the latter a remnant of a decision that is no longer upheld with regard to the former. Moreover, the concerns of finality, comity, judicial economy, and channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate forum that motivated the rejection of the Fay standard in the state procedural default cases are equally applicable to this case. Finally, applying the "cause and prejudice" standard here also advances uniformity in habeas corpus law. Thus, respondent is entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing if he can show cause for his failure to develop the facts in the state court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure, or if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold such a hearing. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494. Pp. 5-12.

926 F.2d 1492 (CA 9 1991), reversed and remanded.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p. 12. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 24.