Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997)

Young v. Harper

No. 95-1598

Argued December 9, 1996
Decided March 18, 1997
520 U.S. 143

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Oklahoma’s Pre-parole Conditional Supervision Program (pre-parole or Program) took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on pre-parole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one-third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board’s recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing respondent’s criminal record and prison conduct, the Board simultaneously recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five apparently uneventful months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by, successively, the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that pre-parole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471.

Held: the Program, as it existed when respondent was released, was equivalent to parole as understood in Morrissey.Morrissey’s description of the "nature of the interest of the parolee in his continued liberty" could just as easily have applied to respondent while he was on pre-parole. In compliance with state procedures, he was released from prison before the expiration of his sentence. See 408 U.S. at 477. He kept his own residence; he sought, obtained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. See id. at 481-482. Although he was not permitted to use alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel outside the county without permission, and he was required to report regularly to a parole officer, similar limits on a parolee’s liberty did not in Morrissey render such liberty beyond procedural protection. Id. at 478. Some of the factors asserted by petitioners to differentiate the Program from parole under Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 -- that pre-parole had the purpose of reducing prison overcrowding, and that a pre-parolee continued to serve his sentence and receive earned credits, remained within the custody of the Department of Corrections, and was aware that he could have been transferred to a higher security level if the Governor denied parole -- do not, in fact, appear to distinguish the two programs at all. Other differences identified by petitioners -- that participation in the Program was ordered by the Board, while the Governor conferred parole; that escaped pre-parolees could be prosecuted as though they had escaped from prison, while escaped parolees were subject only to parole revocation, and that a pre-parolee could not leave Oklahoma under any circumstances, while a parolee could leave the State with his parole officer’s permission -- serve only to set pre-parole apart from the specific terms of parole as it existed in Oklahoma, but not from the more general class of parole identified in Morrissey. The Program appears to have differed from parole in name alone. Pp. 147-153.

4 F.3d 563, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.