Hyatt v. People, 188 U.S. 691 (1903)

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Hyatt v. People

No. 492

Argued January 7, 1903
Decided February 23, 1903
188 U.S. 691

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

A person for whose delivery a demand has been made by executive authority of one state upon the executive authority of another state under clause 2 of section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution, and who shows conclusively, and upon conceded facts, that he was not within the demanding state at the time stated in the indictment, nor at any time when the acts were, if ever, committed, is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of Rev.Stat. sec. 6278, and the federal statute upon the subject of interstate extradition and rendition.

If the governor of the state upon whom the demand is made issues a warrant for the apprehension and delivery of such a person, the warrant is but prima facie sufficient to hold the accused, and it is open to him, on habeas corpus proceedings, to show that the charge upon which his delivery is demanded assumes that he was absent from the demanding state at the time the crime alleged was, if ever, committed.

This proceeding by habeas corpus was commenced by the relator, defendant in error, to obtain his discharge from imprisonment by the plaintiff in error, the Chief of Police in the City of Albany, State of New York, who held the relator by means of a warrant issued in extradition proceedings by the governor of New York. The justice of the supreme court of New York to whom the petition for the writ was addressed, and also, upon appeal, the appellate division of the supreme court of New York, refused to grant the relator’s discharge, but the Court of Appeals reversed their orders and discharged him. 172 N.Y. 176. A writ of error has been taken from this Court to review the latter judgment.

The relator stated in his petition for the writ that he was arrested and detained by virtue of a warrant by the Governor of New York, granted on a requisition from the Governor of Tennessee, reciting that relator had been indicted in that state for the crime of grand larceny and false pretenses, and that he was a fugitive from the justice of that state; that the warrant under which he was held showed that the crimes with which he was charged were committed in Tennessee, and the relator stated that nowhere did it appear in the papers that he was personally present within the State of Tennessee at the time the alleged crimes were stated to have been committed; that the Governor had no jurisdiction to issue his warrant, in that it did not appear before him that the relator was a fugitive from the justice of the State of Tennessee, or had fled therefrom; that it did not appear that there was any evidence that relator was personally or continuously present in Tennessee when the crimes were alleged to have been committed; that it appeared on the face of the indictments accompanying the requisition that no crime under the laws of Tennessee was charged or had been committed. Upon this petition, the writ was issued and served.

The return of the plaintiff in error, the chief of police, was to the effect that the relator was held by virtue of a warrant of the Governor of New York, and a copy of it was annexed.

The Governor’s warrant reads as follows:

New York

Executive Chamber

The Governor of the State of New York to the Chief of Police, Albany, N.Y. and the sheriffs, undersheriffs and other officers of and in the several cities and counties of this state authorized by subdivision 1 of section 827 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to execute this warrant:

It having been represented to me by the Governor of the State of Tennessee that Charles E. Corkran stands charged in that state with having committed therein, in the County of Davidson, the crimes of larceny and false pretenses, which the said Governor certifies to be crimes, under the laws of the said state, and that the said Charles E. Corkran has fled therefrom and taken refuge in the State of New York, and the said Governor of the State of Tennessee having, pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, demanded of me that I cause the said Charles E. Corkran to be arrested and delivered to Vernon Sharpe, who is duly authorized to receive him into his custody and convey him back to the said State of Tennessee; which said demand is accompanied by copies of indictment and other documents duly certified by the said Governor of the State of Tennessee to be authentic and duly authenticated and charging the said Charles E. Corkran with having committed the said crimes and fled from the said state and taken refuge in the State of New York;

You are hereby required to arrest and secure the said Charles E. Corkran wherever he may be found within this state and thereafter and after compliance with the requirements of section 827 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to deliver him into the custody of the said Vernon Sharpe, to be taken back to the said state from which he fled, pursuant to the said requisition, and also to return this warrant and make return to the executive chamber within thirty days from the date hereof of all your proceedings had thereunder, and of the facts and circumstances relating thereto.

Given under my seal and the privy seal of the state at the capitol in the City of Albany, this 13th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two.

[L. S.] B. B. Odell, Jr.

By the Governor: James G. Graham,

Secretary to the Governor

No other paper was returned by the chief of police bearing upon his right to detain the relator. Upon the filing of the return, the relator traversed it in an affidavit, in which he denied that he had committed either the crime of larceny or false pretenses, or any other crime, in the State of Tennessee. He denied that he was within the State of Tennessee at the times mentioned in the indictment upon which the requisition of the Governor was issued; he alleged that he had read the indictments before the Governor of the State of New York, upon which the warrant of arrest was issued, and that they charged him with the commission of the crime of larceny and false pretenses on the 20th and 30th days of April, the 8th day of May, and the 17th and the 24th days of June, 1901. The relator in his affidavit also asserted that he was not in the State of Tennessee at any time in the months of March, April, May, or June, 1901, or at any time for more than a year prior to the month of March, 1901, and he denied that he had fled from the State of Tennessee, or that he was a fugitive from the justice of that state. He further therein stated that he had heard read the papers accompanying the requisition of the Governor of Tennessee to the Governor of New York, and that those papers did not contain any evidence or proof that he had been in the State of Tennessee at any stated time since the 26th and 27th days of May, 1899, and they contained no evidence or proof that he was in the State of Tennessee on any day in any of the months set forth in the indictments when the crime or crimes were alleged to have been committed.

Upon the hearing, the following paper, signed by the respective attorneys for the parties, was filed:

It is conceded that the relator was not within the State of Tennessee between the first day of May, 1899, and the first day of July, 1901. It is also conceded that the relator was in the State of Tennessee on the 2d day of July, 1901.

There is also another stipulation in the record, signed by the attorneys, and reading as follows:

The following additional facts are hereby conceded, and the same shall be incorporated in the appeal record herein, as a part thereof, and shall constitute a part of the record upon which the appellate division may hear and determine the appeal herein, i.e. --

It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties to the above entitled special proceeding that three indictments were attached to the requisition papers sent by the Governor of the State of Tennessee to the Governor of the State of New York for the extradition of Charles E. Corkran; that each of the said indictments was found on the 26th day of February, 1902, and that the alleged crimes were charged in said indictments to have been committed on the first day of May, 1901, on the 8th day of May, 1901, and on the 24th day of June, 1901, respectively.

Upon the hearing before the judge on March 17, 1902, the relator was sworn without out objection, and testified that he had been living in the State of New York for the past fourteen months; that his residence when at home was in Lutherville, Maryland; that he was in the City of Nashville, in the State of Tennessee, on July 2, 1901, and (under objection as immaterial) had gone there on business connected with a lumber company in which he was a heavy stockholder; that he arrived in the city on July 2, in the morning, and left about half-past seven in the evening of the same day, and while there he notified the Union Bank & Trust Company (the subsequent prosecutor herein) that the resignation of the president of the lumber company had been demanded, and would probably be accepted that day. After such notification, and on the same day, the resignation was obtained, and the Union Bank & Trust Company was notified thereof by the relator before leaving the city on the evening of that day; that he passed through the City of Nashville on the 16th or 17th of July thereafter on his way to Chattanooga, but did not stop at Nashville at that time, and had not been in the State of Tennessee since the 16th day of July, 1901 at the time he went to Chattanooga; that he had never lived in the State of Tennessee, and had not been in that state between the 26th or 27th of May, 1899, and the second day of July, 1901.

Upon this state of facts, the judge before whom the hearing was had dismissed the writ and remanded the relator to the custody of the defendant Hyatt, as chief of police. This order was affirmed without any opinion by the appellate division of the supreme court, but, as stated, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals and the relator discharged.