Chapter 90:
1910
Settlement of Fisheries Dispute

For over 130 years the United States and Great Britain had been in dispute over the right to take fish in north Atlantic waters, Great Britain stoutly insisting that its citizens had exclusive privileges in this line. The feeling at times ran so high that there was imminent danger of armed interference by one, or both of the powers, and on several occasions there were forcible seizures of fishing craft which were said to be violating the treaty of 1818. Under this latter treaty the people of the United States were given liberty, in common with British subjects, to take fish of any description along the southern coast of Newfoundland, and certain parts of the Labrador coast. In return for this the United States renounced forever the right to fish within three miles of the coasts of British North America not included in the specially exempted territory.

So far as mere fishing rights were concerned the treaty of 1818 was plain enough, and there was no reasonable grounds for misunderstanding or dispute. Trouble arose over the right of Americans to obtain supplies of bait fishes in the waters of Newfoundland, the only place where they are to be had. Newfound land denied this right to American fishermen, and the governments of Canada and Great Britain became involved. A crisis was fast approaching when it was finally decided (January, 1909,) to submit the matter to the Hague tribunal, the following arbitrators being selected:

Prof. H. Lammasch of Austria, president; Dr. Luis Drago of Argentine, Jhr. M. A. F. de Savornin Lohman of Holland, Sir Charles Fitzpatrick of Great Britain, and Judge George Gray of the United States.

Counsel on behalf of the United States were Chandler P. Anderson of New York, agent; Elihu Root, senator from New York; George Turner of Spokane, Wash.; Samuel J. Elder of Boston, Mass.; Dr. James Brown Scott, solicitor of the State department; Charles B. Warren, of Detroit, Mich., and Robert Lansing, of Watertown, N. Y.

Counsel on behalf of Great Britain were A. B. Aylesworth, minister of justice of Canada, agent; Sir William Robinson, K. C., attorney-general for England; Sir Robert Finly, K. C., former attorney-general for England; Sir H. Erle Richards, K. C., of England; John S. Ewart, K. C., of Canada; George W. Shepley, K. C., of Canada; W. N. Tilley, of Canada; Sir Edward Morris, K. C., premier of Newfoundland; Sir James Winter, K. C., former attorney-general of Newfoundland, and D. Morrison, K. C., attorney-general of Newfoundland.

September 7th, 1910, the tribunal decided in favor of the United States on all the principal points at issue. It held:

1st—That Great Britain has a right to make regulations for the preservation of its fisheries without the consent of the United States, but that if the latter country should object to any new regulation it must not be put into effect until a permanent mixed fishery commission has passed upon it.

2d—Inhabitants of the United States have the right to employ non-inhabitants as members of their fishing crews, but such non-inhabitants derive no benefit or immunity from the treaty.

3d—Exercise of fishing liberty by inhabitants of the United States should not be subjected to the purely commercial formalities of report, entry and clearance at a custom house, nor to light, harbor or other dues not imposed upon Newfoundland fishermen.

4th—There can be no restriction of the privileges granted by treaty to enter certain bays and harbors for shelter, repairs, wood and water, but, in order that these privileges may not be abused, American fishermen entering such bays or harbors for the purposes named, and remaining over forty-eight hours, can be required to report in person or by telegraph to some custom house, or customs official.

5th—Giving official definition to the word "bay" within the meaning of the treaty.

6th—American fishermen are entitled to take fish of every description (this includes bait fishes) on all the treaty coasts in Newfoundland and Labrador.

7th—American fishermen have the same commercial privileges on the treaty coasts as are accorded by agreement or otherwise to United States trading vessels generally, provided the liberty of fishing and the commercial privileges are not exercised concurrently.

This report was signed by the five arbitrators, there being no dissenting opinion except in the case of Paragraph 5. In this instance D Drago, the president of the tribunal, said he could not wholly endorse the views of his brother members as to the definition of the word "bay."

In this connection the report reads: "In case of bays three marine miles are to be measured from a straight line drawn across the body of water at the place where it ceases to have the configuration and characteristics of a bay. At all other places the three marine miles are to be measured following the sinuosities of the coast. Considering that the tribunal cannot overlook that this answer to question five, although correct in principle and the only one possible in view of the want of a sufficient basis for a more concrete answer, is not entirely satisfactory as to its practical applicability and that it leaves room for doubts and differences in practice; therefore the tribunal considers it its duty to render the decision more practicable and to remove the danger of future differences by adjoining to it a recommendation in virtue of the responsibilities imposed by article IV of the special agreement. Considering, moreover, that in treaties with France, with the North German confederation and the German empire and likewise in the North sea convention, Great Britain has adopted for similar cases the rule that only bays of ten miles width should be considered as those wherein the fishing is reserved to nationals, and that in the course of negotiations between Great Britain and the United States a similar rule has been on various occasions proposed and adopted by Great Britain in instructions to the naval officers stationed on these coasts, and that though these circumstances are not sufficient to constitute this a principle of law, it seems reasonable to propose this rule with certain exceptions, all the more that this rule with such exceptions has already formed the basis of an agreement between the two powers."

At the close of 1910 the United States controlled seven non-contiguous colonies (they are officially known as territories) with a combined population of 9,035,713, and an area of 1,414,711 square miles, exclusive of Hawaii, the area of which it appears to be impossible to get accurately. These territories consist of:

Philippine Islands—Area 832,968 square miles, population 7,635,436. Ceded by Spain, December 10, 1898.

Alaska—Area 577,390 square miles, population 64,356. Purchased from Russia in March, 1867.

Puerto Rico—Area 3,600 square miles, population, 1,118,012. Ceded by Spain, December 10, 1898.

Hawaii—Exact area unknown, population 194,909. Annexed by United States July 7, 1898.

Guam—Area 200 square miles, population 9,000. Ceded by Spain December 10, 1898.

Tutuila—Area 79 square miles, population 4,000. Acquired by United States in January, 1900.

Panama Canal Zone—Area 474 square miles, population small aside from the temporary canal force. Bought from Panama February 26, 1904.

Of these possessions the most important in a commercial way is Hawaii. In 1910 the Hawaiian trade with the United States amounted to $66,450,305. Of this $46,161,288 was represented by shipments to this country, and $20,289,017 by merchandise bought here. The principal Hawaiian products are sugar, coffee, fruits, wool and rice. Iron, steel and machinery constitute the main purchases made for the islands.

Next in importance (commercially) comes Puerto Rico. The commerce of the island in 1910 amounted to $58,082,311. Of this $32,272,940 was in exports, and $25,809,371 in imports. As free trade exists between Puerto Rico and this country the United States naturally gets the largest part of the island trade, its share last year being $48,663,508 out of the total of $58,082,311. The chief exports are coffee, oranges, brown sugar and tobacco. Imports consist mainly of machinery, and manufactured articles.

While the Philippines stand a little higher than Puerto Rico in the total volume of trade, it being $58,785,960, a large part of this goes to foreign countries and the United States does not begin to get the same relative proportion that it does in Puerto Rico, although there is a constant improvement in this direction, and American merchants are obtaining more and more recognition. In 1910, for instance, the United States sent merchandise valued at $16,768,909 to the Philippines, as against only $11,182,175 the previous year. Our imports showed an even larger increase, being $17,317,897 in 1910, as compared with $9,433,986 in 1909. The Filipinos buy largely of breadstuffs, cotton manufacturers, iron, steel and wood manufactures. Their sales are principally of raw manila and sugar.

Alaska has a trade surprisingly large considering the small population and immense extent of territory. In 1910 is footed up $30,322,109, of which $17,972,647 represented goods shipped there, and $12,349,462 the value of copper ore, salmon and whalebone sent to the United States. In addition to this there is a constant production of gold, the shipments of this metal to the United States in 1909 amounting to $18,275,424, or considerably more than double the sum this country paid Russia ($7,000,000) for Alaska in 1867. The sealing industry, which was originally the most important in the territory, appears to be dying out, the murderous, wasteful tactics of the sealers having decimated the herds to the point of extinction.

The other possessions count for little in the way of their trade, their acquisition being based solely on strategic grounds. The control of the canal zone was essential to the construction and effective policing of the canal, while Guam and Tutuila are of importance only as naval bases.

From the four possessions of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Alaska and the Philippines we derive a yearly trade amounting to $179,522,728. If to this we add the $18,275,424 in gold sent out of Alaska in 1909 we have a total of $197,797,152, or close to $200,000,000. What it costs in the way of official salaries, and army and navy expenses, to secure this trade is a matter which is attracting the attention of political economists, and the question, "does it pay?" is a subject of lively discussion.

Looked upon simply as financial investments it does not require much argument to show that, after the expenses of maintenance are met, the credit is on the wrong side of the ledger, if we place the United States solely in the attitude of a trader on its own account. But the territorial investments of governments should not be considered solely from this Viewpoint. The people at large are benefitted by the trade thus built up, the nation is enabled to maintain military and naval stations of vantage, and the latent resources of the possessions are developed to the ultimate profit of the country which fosters them.

Continued occupation of the Philippines, for instance, is said to be justified, first in the interests of civilization, and secondly by the fact that the proper protection of American commerce and trade, not only with these islands, but with the Orient as a whole, makes it imperative that the United States should have a permanent base of operations in far Eastern waters.